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Nigeria: Resolving the so-called ‘Igbo Problem’

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To paraphrase Karl Marx, there is a spectre haunting Nigeria – the spectre of disintegration. At no time has the presence of this spectre being so palpably felt than in the last three months.

Every day, the front pages of Nigeria’s newspapers are filled with reports of abductions, kidnappings for ransom, political assassinations, etc. Rather than design and promulgate policies to arrest the deterioration, President Buhari and his aides have been busy searching for people and groups to blame. It is clear to any objective observer that the president has lost control of the country.

Biafra is an idea, a dream, founded on a shared sense of loss, grief and victimhood.

The Indigenous People of Biafra

Of all the groups alleged to be threatening Nigeria at the moment, none appears to be causing as much concern to the current administration as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a radical breakaway faction of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) – an openly secessionist movement whose aim is to “restore the independent state of Biafra” in the mainly Igbo-speaking south-east region.

IPOB is not the only secessionist movement in Nigeria; there is also one in the west – the Oodua Republic movement. Technically, Boko Haram, the extremist Islamic group that has terrorised the northeastern part of Nigeria for more than a decade with aims to create an Islamic State in the territory of Nigeria, is another secessionist group. But none vexes the Nigerian government and some elements in northern Nigeria like IPOB and the Igbo tribe.

For many jobless, disenfranchised jobless Igbo youth, Biafra has become an idea, a dream, an imagined better place than a Nigeria that has shuttered opportunities for them. Unfortunately, Nigerian authorities and Igbo leaders have failed to recogniSe the new meaning of Biafra as an idea, an aspiration, similar in emotive power as “Next year in Jerusalem” was and remains for Jews all over the world.

Biafra is an idea, a dream, founded on a shared sense of loss, grief and victimhood. IPOB, driven by this idea, is seen by Nigerian authorities as a strong challenge to the state.

The agitation for Biafra as the most visible expression of the endless but legitimate complaints by Igbo of marginalisation by Nigeria has created what I would call the “Igbo problem.”

The “Igbo problem”

Some commentators have argued that the “Igbo problem” was created by the Igbo themselves – that it is an injury that Igbos inflicted on themselves by staging the first coup d’état in 1966 and then trying to secede from the federation, leading the country to wage war against them.

According to these commentators, the Igbo Problem dates back to January 1966 and the civil war that followed. Perhaps so. However, this view has elements of revisionism. There were pogroms against Ndi’igbo (Igbo people) way before Nigeria became an independent country.

No one will win the argument about which ethnic group is accountable or responsible for the many difficulties of Nigeria and its failure thus far to be a successful country. A debate about the incompetence of the current federal government has quickly degenerated to one of mutual hurling of insults across ethnic lines.

Nigeria is not working for most Nigerians.

All ethnic groups are affected by the poor state of governance in Nigeria today and are protesting. The most intriguing thing is the discriminatory attitude of the federal government to particular protests and other threats to the integrity of the country.

Killings by Fulani herdsmen appears to be tolerable but protests by IPOB about the status (and conditions) of Ndi’igbo in Nigeria are without hesitation classified as a threat of the highest level to national security by the current administration.

The agitation in the south-east is now presented by some sections of the country as worse than the longstanding brutal, extremist Islamic insurgency in the north-east, as well as the unbridled banditry and the modern-day inter-tribal wars in southern Kaduna and Plateau State.

Hostages of the Nigerian state and economy, some Igbo “leaders” have condemned IPOB and its paramilitary wing –  Eastern Security Network (ESN), much more vehemently and unreservedly than many northern Nigeria leaders have condemned Boko Haram in ten years.

Nigeria is not working for most Nigerians. Many of the youth, whether Igbo, Yoruba, Izon, or Tivi, do not see any future in the country. Those able to leaving. There has to be a stop to this under-performance. If something is not working, it is futile to continue to expend precious and scarce time and resources on it.

How can Nigeria work?

One way to get Nigeria to work for Nigerians could be for “Nigerians” who hate Ndi’igbo to just expel them since they are believed by some powerful segments to be the country’s problem.

There is no reason to continue to co-habit the same political space with “irritants, endless agitators, criminals, and impossible-to-satisfy-secessionists” as some northern Nigerian groups have described Ndi’igbo. The expulsion of Ndi’Igbo from Nigeria could be by a vote in both houses of the National Assembly,

No referendum would be required. Convene a joint session of the National Assembly and take an up and down vote on whether Ndi’Igbo should continue to be a part of Nigeria.Expulsion will be an infinitely better option than another civil war. A vote in the National Assembly will infinitely cost less in terms of lives and treasure than a referendum.

There is no profit in staying in a toxic relationship and hoping that it will, perhaps by the grace of God, improve sometime in the future.

History provides some examples of successful expulsions of “irritant” communities. On 9 August 1965, Malaysia expelled Singapore and it is today a very successful economy, as is Malaysia.The Chinese Communist Party expelled the Kuomintang to Taiwan, and both mainland China and Taiwan have done well. The list goes on.

Nigeria will be “much better, more cohesive and prosperous, more focused without Ndi’igbo.” All the recent anti-Igbo statements from high-ranking officials in the Buhari administration suggest it could be.

Nigeria should thus let the Ndi’igbo go peacefully so that it can focus on building a much greater and better Nigeria. That would be the best thing to do under the current circumstances. It is certainly better than operating a suboptimal entity lacking in mutual trust with endless hurling of recriminations and antagonisms.

This is not a radical idea. I am proposing a feasible solution to a seemingly endless/intractable problem. There is no profit in staying in a toxic relationship and hoping that it will, perhaps by the grace of God, improve sometime in the future. There is no point in hoping for this as the national leadership is not making any good faith effort in that direction. Nigeria will not progress as fast as it ought to as long as the Igbo “continue to hold her down with their never-ending irritating conduct.”

Nigeria, since she appears unwilling to grant Ndi’igbo full citizenship rights, should have the courage to bring a peaceful end to the “Igbo problem”. Either accept Ndi’igbo as Nigerians with the full prerogatives, rights and responsibilities of citizenship, or expel them from the federation – let them go to either succeed or fail.

And note, just as Israel has not succeeded in subduing Hamas by force, so the Buhari administration will be unable to subdue IPOB. The reason is simple – Biafra is an idea and the only way to counter an idea is with a superior idea.

The federal government must make a strong case for Nigerian unity. The Buhari administration perhaps thinks that asserting that the unity of Nigeria is non-negotiable is sufficient. It deludes itself. It should look at the USSR, former Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia and the ongoing efforts by Scotland to secede from the UK after more than 300 years of union.

Bottom line

The decision of the federal government to direct the Nigerian armed forces to bomb Eastern Nigeria to flush out the abominable secessionist IPOB is unwarranted and unfair.

It exposes everyone in the region to military action. Yet not every Igbo is in IPOB/ESN or even a sympathiser. It is also resulting in the loss of life and assets and cannot therefore be an idea superior to the idea of “Biafra, a state of our own where we will be treated with dignity and respect as full citizens.”

One Nigeria is increasingly a tall challenge because the idea does not hold great appeal for many young people from the south of the country, especially Igbo youth. Do not get me wrong: I do not advocate the splintering of Nigeria into separate sovereignties. I want a united, progressive and stable Nigeria.

I want to remain Nigerian. But it must be a Nigeria that works for everyone, for all of us, a Nigeria where everyone’s right to full citizenship is not abridged or circumscribed in any way, either wittingly or unwittingly by race, religion, or ethnicity or by the government; a Nigeria with constituent parts that are respectful of each other.

A Nigeria that fails to guarantee full citizenship rights to all its citizens will remain an arena of endless protests and conflicts. And that Nigeria is unlikely to achieve her potentials and arrive at her destiny.

Culled from the Africa Report

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From Noise to Votes: Nigerian Youth Must Turn Online Fire into Electoral Power

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Young Nigerians have shown a remarkable ability to create waves in the digital space. With a single click, they can expose a politician’s corruption, rally tens of thousands of supporters behind a single hashtag, and keep every political actor on edge from dawn until dusk. However, as the 2027 general elections draw closer, it is time to face an uncomfortable truth: loud online noise isn’t the same as real power in the political sphere. If Nigerian youth wish to get the best possible leadership from their nation’s leaders, they need to take their online activity offline (i.e., to places where actual democracy occurs) and start showing up to cast votes.

There is simply too much evidence to ignore that this needs to occur. Nigeria is a young country demographically. Together, Gen Z and Millennials comprise approximately half of the total population—50.1 percent—according to IntelPoint. Gen Z makes up 25.8 percent and Millennials account for 24.3 percent. When we consider Gen Alpha, the percentage rises to 85.7% of the population under 44. According to ActionAid Nigeria, more than 60% of Nigeria’s population is under 30. According to Afrobarometer, Nigeria has a median age of 18.1 years, and 58% of its population is aged 0-29. Therefore, Nigeria isn’t merely a young country; it is a country dominated by young people.

Based on this information, this dominant demographic should wield considerable political influence. Unfortunately, there often appears to be little correlation between these statistics and political influence. The contrast is striking. While a majority of Nigeria’s population is young, there remains a significant gap between how influential young people are politically and how influential they could be. This lack of influence is not due to a lack of ability among young people; rather, it stems from many young people stopping short of completing what is often called the “civic journey,” which involves moving from awareness to action. They consume politics, engage in political debate on social media, participate in meme politics, and express frustration with politics through social media rants; however, many young people still fail to register to vote (PVCs) or participate in elections in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome.

This disparity is important because youth dissatisfaction is far from abstract. More than 23% of Nigerian youth report being unemployed or seeking employment, according to Afrobarometer. Additionally, more than two-thirds of youth aged 18 to 35 report having some form of postsecondary or secondary-level education. Despite Nigeria ranking among the lowest in providing employment and opportunities for youth, and despite identifying high costs of living, unemployment, crime and security concerns, poverty, poor economic management practices, and insufficient access to electricity as the top five issues requiring immediate attention from government officials, youth dissatisfaction cannot be considered indifferent. Rather, youth dissatisfaction reflects citizens’ grievances and legitimate reasons to be deeply interested in who governs their country.

However, mere interest alone will not suffice. Democracy does not reward passion without participation. A young person can identify every weakness inherent in a political system; however, unless that person participates by casting a vote, they will remain a spectator to their own future. If you are mature enough to understand concepts such as inflation, insecurity, broken campaign promises, unemployment rates, and poorly managed governance systems, you are mature enough to accept responsibility for your role in creating solutions to those problems. That responsibility begins with voting.

In addition to continuing to use social media to raise awareness of voter registration, election knowledge, fact-checking mechanisms used during elections, and peaceful participation methods, social media can also serve as a vehicle for facilitating the transition from social media activism to actual civic engagement. Young Nigerians should leverage their social media presence to encourage voter registration, promote election literacy programs, provide fact-checking services to counter election misinformation, and advocate for nonviolent participation throughout the electoral cycle. They should convert their social media timelines into civic classrooms. Where can I find the information I need about voter registration processes? Where is my assigned polling station located? Where do I receive my Permanent Voter Card? How do I protect myself from spreading misinformation? How do I properly monitor election results? These are not dull topics; they represent essential tools required for surviving democracy.

Youth organizations, creators, and social media entities can also help facilitate offline civic engagement. Use your WhatsApp groups to alert others as registration deadlines approach. Use X Spaces and Instagram Live to focus on discussing relevant issues rather than hurling insults. Use TikTok to simplify the voting process. Use Facebook to motivate family members and first-time voters to participate in elections. Use whatever platforms are available to make civic obligation contagious. Nigeria’s youth have shown they can create viral content. Now they must begin to generate participation on a viral scale.

One of the most damaging myths in Nigerian politics is that “your vote doesn’t matter.” It is a self-fulfilling prophecy that only serves the interests of cynics, crooks, and machines whose success depends solely on low turnout. Yes, Nigeria’s electoral process has flaws. Yes, there have been numerous disappointments. However, the response to a flawed democracy is not abandonment; it is increased participation. By staying home on Election Day, youth essentially give their votes — and therefore control — directly to the very same groups they loathe.

Another mythological excuse for the youth’s failure to vote in Nigeria is the claim that “all politicians are alike.” No — they’re not all the same. While some politicians are inept, others are corrupt, and others exhibit both characteristics, democracy is not about seeking holy men or women; it is about making selections and enforcing accountability. An individual who refuses to make a selection for office because none of the options appear acceptable is ultimately selecting the candidate most likely to emerge victorious by default.

Nigeria’s youth already constitute the country’s largest demographic group. It is time for them to become its strongest democratic force as well. However, that will not be achieved by trending hashtags alone. Instead, it will be achieved when online energy is harnessed and directed toward political organization, civic education, voter registration, increasing voter turnout, and holding elected representatives accountable after elections.

The 2023 election saw remarkable youth participation but lacked follow-up. Therefore, the 2027 election should not produce another generation of disillusioned observers; instead, it should yield a new generation of participatory citizens. Let online flames ignite electoral power. Let debates become ballots. Let criticism evolve into participation. If Nigerian youth can dominate social media, they can also dominate democracy. The future will not be handed to them in a retweet. They must elect it into existence.

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♦ Chris Ulasi is on the Editorial Board of The West African Pilot News. He contributes stories about culture and tradition, elite politics, ethnicity and national integration, civil society, and social movement. He is a university professor, community builder, poet, film producer, recording the emergent Nollywood cultural history through film.

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Anthony Obi Ogbo

Between Silence and Sabotage: Jonathan’s Return to Political Manipulation

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“Jonathan’s calculated and weaponized ambiguity breeds deception and weakens emerging political alliances.” —Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo

Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has once again found himself at the center of presidential speculation, floating silently above the country’s political waters while supporters aggressively market him as a possible candidate ahead of another critical election cycle. And once again, Jonathan is doing what he has mastered throughout his political career: saying nothing clearly while allowing political confusion to grow around him.

This pattern is not new. It is the same indecisive political behavior that defined some of the most consequential moments of his rise and fall. Jonathan became president in 2010 following the death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. At the time, many northern political stakeholders within the then-ruling PDP believed there was an informal understanding that Jonathan would complete Yar’Adua’s term but not seek another full term in 2011, thereby preserving the party’s zoning arrangement between North and South. Instead of taking a clear and immediate position, Jonathan spent months dribbling the nation politically. He neither fully denied nor openly confirmed his intentions until the political tension had already escalated nationwide.

By the time he eventually declared his candidacy, the damage had been done. Many northern allies who initially supported him felt betrayed, politically cornered, or deceived. The PDP fractured internally, regional distrust deepened, and Jonathan’s relationship with major northern power blocs deteriorated permanently. Though he won the 2011 election, the cracks created by that indecision followed him into 2015, contributing significantly to the coalition that eventually removed him from power.

Yet Jonathan learned little from that experience. Since losing reelection in 2015, his name has repeatedly surfaced during every major electoral cycle as a potential presidential contender. Each time, his supporters strategically floated his candidacy across media platforms and political circles. Each time, Jonathan refused to decisively shut the door. Silence became his political instrument, whereas ambiguity became his strategy.

Now the country is witnessing the same playbook again. As coalition politics intensify and opposition forces attempt to consolidate around alternative political movements, Jonathan’s name has resurfaced aggressively. Reports and speculations about his presidential ambition continue to dominate political discussions, especially within camps seeking to disrupt the growing momentum surrounding Peter Obi and emerging opposition realignments.

The troubling part is not merely that Jonathan’s supporters are campaigning. The troubling part is that Jonathan fully understands the implications of his silence. He knows that his political stature carries enough weight to destabilize fragile coalition negotiations. He knows his name alone can divide campaign structures, weaken consensus-building, and inject uncertainty into opposition calculations. Yet he refuses to publicly and definitively state where he stands.

That is not statesmanship. That is calculated political ambiguity. Jonathan’s political history is filled with similarly contradictory choices. After losing power in 2015, he received widespread praise for conceding defeat peacefully. He initially framed that decision as a sacrifice made to preserve Nigerian lives and prevent violence. Later, however, different narratives emerged suggesting international pressure, particularly from the United States under President Obama. The shifting explanations weakened what could have remained one of his strongest democratic legacies.

Then came another contradiction. Despite emerging politically from the PDP, Jonathan gradually aligned himself closely with the administration of former President Muhammadu Buhari, serving in diplomatic and goodwill capacities that many PDP loyalists considered politically inappropriate. This unusual closeness fueled longstanding allegations that elements within the APC establishment viewed Jonathan as a useful political instrument capable of destabilizing opposition coalitions from within. Whether those allegations are true or not, Jonathan’s conduct has consistently created room for suspicion.

His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible.

Today, his undeclared ambition is already generating confusion among supporters, coalition organizers, and opposition strategists. His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible. His intentions are unclear. Yet his loyalists continue mobilizing aggressively in his name while he watches silently from the shadows.

Nigeria is too politically fragile for this kind of elite gamesmanship. At critical national moments, leadership demands clarity, courage, and accountability. Jonathan cannot continue operating as a permanent “maybe” in Nigeria’s political future, thoughtlessly hovering around every election season like an unanswered question designed to manipulate negotiations and weaken emerging alliances.

At this time, Jonathan should sit in or sit out! If he wants to run, he should declare openly, defend his record, and face the democratic process directly. If he does not intend to run, he should immediately and publicly withdraw his name from the political marketplace. Anything short of that increasingly looks less like political strategy and more like calculated deception. Nigeria deserves leaders who make difficult choices openly—not politicians who weaponize silence while others gamble with national uncertainty in their name.

♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015)  and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us

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The Devastation of Insurgency: Nigeria Cannot Kill Its Way Out of Insecurity

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“Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent” —Dr. Declan Onwudiwe

Nigeria cannot kill its way out of insecurity. While military victories may win battles, only legitimacy, governance, and economic opportunity can secure lasting peace. Across the country, persistent violence, characterized by impunity and a tragic disregard for human life, has exposed the limits of a force-only approach. The time has come for a more sweeping and planned security response.

What is most troubling is the continuing victimization of innocent citizens, especially women and children. Reports of attacks on farmers, worshippers in churches and mosques, and travelers have become disturbingly routine. Kidnappings, sexual violence, and the killing of schoolchildren have weakened public confidence in the state’s ability to protect its people. These are not individual events but symptoms of a deeper structural crisis. Yet, Nigeria is not without options. A strategic and sustained plan can alter this trajectory.

Cooperation between Nigeria’s security forces and international partners is praiseworthy and necessary. However, a recurring weakness undermines these gains: areas cleared by the military are often left insufficiently secured, allowing insurgents and bandits to return. A viable strategy must go beyond clearing territory to consolidating control. Insurgent groups adapt rapidly; after defeat, they disperse, regroup, and re-emerge in areas where governance is weak. Every community reclaimed by force but left without sustained state presence risks becoming tomorrow’s battleground.

Experience from other regions underscores this point. Countries such as Colombia and Iraq that have made substantial progress against insurgency have done so by maintaining a firm and continuous government presence in liberated areas. Where state authority is visible through security, justice, and basic services, insurgents find it much harder to re-establish control. Where it is absent, violence returns. Nigeria must learn from this reality and prioritize holding territory as much as reclaiming it.

At the heart of the problem is a governance deficit. Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent. Recovered areas commonly lack functioning institutions, effective policing, and access to justice. Without these, citizens remain vulnerable, and security gains become temporary. A credible strategy must ensure that communities reclaimed by security forces are immediately supported with police presence, local administration, and basic services, including healthcare, education, and dispute resolution.

Equally important is the recognition that the population, not the battlefield, is the true center of gravity in counterinsurgency. Intelligence from local communities is indispensable, but it depends on trust. Where citizens feel protected and respected, they are more willing to share information. Where they feel neglected or abused, they withdraw. Strengthening this relationship between citizens and the state is essential.

Intelligence-led security operations are far more effective than broad, reactive force. Targeted precision, based on reliable information, disrupts insurgent leadership, logistics, and financing networks. But this requires the population’s cooperation. When criminals operate with impunity, and accountability is weak, citizens lose confidence and hesitate to engage. Restoring trust, therefore, requires both professionalism within the security forces and a justice system that swiftly and fairly punishes wrongdoing.

Beyond security operations, Nigeria must address the economic drivers of instability. Youth unemployment and underemployment remain major concerns. Many young people struggle to find meaningful livelihoods, keeping them vulnerable to exploitation by criminal and extremist networks. Security cannot be sustained without opportunity. Investments in agriculture, education, infrastructure, electricity, and small-scale industry are not just economic policies; they are security measures. A population rich in hope and opportunity is less susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by violent groups.

The question of self-defense has also entered public debate. While communities have a natural right to protect themselves and arm themselves, widespread and unregulated access to weapons carries serious risks. Criminological literature shows that the proliferation of arms without accountability can fuel cycles of violence and create new security challenges. The solution is not to transform communities into rival armed camps but to build structured partnerships between citizens and the state.

Community-based security initiatives can play a valuable role when properly organized, regulated, and integrated into the wider security framework. Groups such as local defense volunteers should operate under unambiguous legal authority, receive appropriate training, and remain accountable to state institutions. When managed effectively, such partnerships can enhance intelligence gathering, strengthen local resilience, and complement formal security forces.

Nigeria now remains at a crossroads. It can continue to approach insecurity primarily as a military problem and remain trapped in a cycle of temporary victories followed by renewed violence. Or it can adopt a more extensive, more strategic approach, one that acknowledges that sustainable security depends on governance, legitimacy, and opportunity as much as on force.

The way forward is clear. Nigeria must hold every liberated area through sustained security and governance. It must prioritize intelligence by building trust with local communities. It must deliver a visible and tangible state presence through schools, healthcare, and justice systems. It must formalize and regulate community-based security initiatives. And it must expand economic opportunities to reduce the appeal of violence and criminality.

Countries that have turned the tide against insurgency did so not through force alone, but by rebuilding the bond between the state and its people. Nigeria must do the same. Until that bond is strengthened, insecurity will remain not just a threat at the margins, but a challenge rooted at the core of the nation’s stability.

Only through a coordinated, long-term strategy can Nigeria move from managing insecurity to truly controlling it.

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■ Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe, Ph.D., of the School of Public Affairs, Texas Southern University, is a Professor and Director, Africa Institute for Strategic Security Studies (AISSS). He is also on the EDITORIAL BOARD of  the WAP

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