Anthony Obi Ogbo
Why APC and PDP are hopeless and politically dangerous
“PDP was set up to defraud Nigeria; APC was set up to remove Jonathan. Both parties have since accomplished their objectives and might not offer anything new,” ―Anthony Obi Ogbo
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In November 2016, almost 18 months into the regime of the All Progressives Congress (APC), Professor Hassan Saliu, a former Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, stated during a media interview that the APC’s sole change agenda was removing the incumbent, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. He may have been right, because in April 2017, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu expressed similar thoughts, and even bragged that he would “write a book to reveal how Jonathan was removed.” At the time, he was the APC’s national leader, and he is now the party’s presidential candidate for the upcoming election.
Political trends over the years suggest that the acquisitive monopoly of power is the only constructive agenda of both the APC and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). This has been proven, because both parties have operated with no detectible policy agenda and no system structural ideology—instead, they have engaged in increasing the recycling of members to exploit the system. For instance, in February 2021, Nigeria’s Senate President, Ahmad Lawan, vowed that his party, the APC, would surpass the PDP’s record by dominating the central government for more than 16 years. The PDP ruled Nigeria for 16 years after the return of democracy in 1999, until it was removed by the APC in 2015.
Surprisingly, Lawan’s comment has been replicated by most staunch members of the APC, who believe that tenure-sharing between the two major parties should outline the basis for making choices in the upcoming 2023 elections. Alternatively, the PDP wants Nigerians to ignore its 16‑year disastrous stewardship and focus on APC’s catastrophic 7-year regime.
The originations of both parties should remind Nigerians that their much-awaited milk and honey will never come from either party. For instance, the PDP was conceived to defraud this country and enrich a selected political upper-class—largely, those connected with second republic politicians and their allies in the defense sector. Consequently, the APC was established with one major motive—to remove Jonathan, who became a distraction and a pain to the elite and the draconian political godfathers. In essence, the APC and the PDP parties have accomplished their objectives and will never offer anything new. Both parties are essentially hopeless and politically dangerous in building any path to Nigeria’s democracy.
The formation of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 1998 was convenient because Nigerians were struggling under the protracted military dictatorship of Gen. Sani Abacha, who vowed to stay put. Abacha’s untimely death in June 1998 signaled the end of 16 years of military rule; the interim government proposed holding an election the following year.
The PDP won the people’s hearts because it was primarily formed by members of numerous groups and organizations who were very vocal about the outgoing junta regime. The party also floated an ideology that reflected a broader political base, supported economic deregulation and human rights, and advocated greater funding for health care and education.
It didn’t stop there; the PDP boosted its favorability when it created an unofficial policy of rotating the presidency between candidates from the predominantly Christian south and the Muslim north. They actually lived up to that promise. After the regime of Olusegun Obasanjo and Atiku Abubakar, the party candidates were Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a Muslim and the governor of the northern state of Katsina, and Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and the governor of the southern state of Bayelsa.
Jonathan’s first misstep was boldly alienating some of his political godfathers, including a former President who was somehow instrumental in his rise to the presidency, retired Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo went after Jonathan in sheer retaliation and fired off an 18-page public letter in 2013 containing lacerating criticism of his regime. He also categorically stated that it would be “morally flawed” for Jonathan to run for re-election in 2015.
A massive growing antagonism over Jonathan led to the unification of Nigeria’s three biggest opposition parties, and ultimately a merger; the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), and the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) became the All Progressives Congress (APC).
The APC executed two campaign strategies. The first was concocting and infiltrating the system with a collection of conspiracy theories to derail Jonathan’s popularity and suppress PDP’s control. Then they showcased a fabricated campaign agenda and wooed the vulnerable masses with thousands of inconceivable campaign promises. In addition to deceiving the youth with fake promises of education and employment opportunities, the desperate APC campaigned on complete system restructuring, total obliteration of terrorist insurgencies within months, and transforming the country’s currency, Naira, to have equal value with the dollar. This is how Nigeria got to its present governance uncertainty.
The political implications of the dysfunctional power control by the APC and the PDP is that the nation of Nigeria is in trouble. Here is why—for over 23 years, the PDP and the APC have been the epicenters of the downfall of Nigeria at all levels of governance. Today, after almost seven years of ruling, the APC has dragged Nigeria into a near economic depression. The bad news is that the same APC is scheming to remain in power without any blueprint to fix the system failure it has been facilitating.
The good news is that the suffering Nigerian masses have the chance to elect a new regime. However, the question is whether these voters are sincere enough to reject the gangs of predatory candidates and parties that triggered the current predicament at the polls. Are Nigerians ready to ignore the current APC-PDP ruthless power-sharing culture to embrace something entirely new?
Listen to Dino Melaye, a former lawmaker who represented Kogi West Senatorial District, as he addressed Peter Obi, the Labour Party presidential candidate: “By the grace of God, you have the potential of being the president in the nearest future. I celebrate you and I celebrate your movement for a new Nigeria. While I celebrate you, I want to advise you that your time is not now. You have to wait for your time.”
Melaye’s mentality harmonizes with the same culture that has kept this country in bondage under a ruthless mob of political elites; they believe that a selected few are entitled to democratic governance. The elitist political cliques decide who will lead the central government, then impose their will on the vulnerable masses.
Nigerian voters have been very hypocritical when making electoral decisions in the past.
The electorates are also part of the problem. Nigerian voters have been very hypocritical when making electoral decisions in the past. Their voting habits have been stupid and self-destructive. Yet it is apparent that Nigeria can never survive under the APC or the PDP, because those parties can only cause more miseries and hardship.
The third ballot option is Peter Obi and his Labour Party (LP). There is no doubt that ushering in such a novice party and candidate with minimal legislative backup would create bumpy decision-making pathways and slow down tough legislative proposals. Frankly, with the LP option, there might be an uphill battle between the executive and the opposition legislative branches. The former would be struggling to overhaul the structures, whereas the latter would be fighting tooth-and-nail to maintain an oppressive status quo.
But those are core challenges associated with the change process―the fear and resistance of the anti-change agents regarding something entirely new. Those opposed to the change process could go to every length to retain a malfunctioned prevailing culture. Nevertheless, in the democratic process, such differences can be negotiated.
Regardless of the nature of the campaign, at this time it may be necessary to put emotions, ethnic connectivity, and personal interests aside in order to impartially accept the fact that Nigeria will never survive as a nation under either the APC or the PDP. Any other party, any other candidate, stands a better chance to pull this great nation out of its current deadly slumber―but definitely not the APC, and not the PDP.
♦Publisher of the Guardian News, Journalism and RTF Professor, Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D. is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths—Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo
More than five decades after the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970, former Head of State Yakubu Gowon has finally offered his own detailed account of the conflict that permanently reshaped Nigeria. Gowon, who became Nigeria’s leader in 1966 after the counter-coup that followed the assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, presided over the most tragic chapter in the nation’s history—the Biafran War that claimed millions of lives, many of them civilians. Ironically, the same military establishment that elevated him during the crisis later removed him from power in 1975 while he attended an OAU summit in Uganda.
His long-awaited memoir has reopened old wounds and revived unresolved questions about the war, the collapse of the Aburi Accord, and the decades-long collective silence that followed the conflict. The biggest question, however, is this: why now?
Why did Gowon wait more than fifty years after the war to tell his side of the story, especially when nearly all the principal actors are gone? Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu published multiple accounts and speeches in defense of Biafra and in criticism of the federal government’s handling of the crisis. Former military leaders and participants also documented their perspectives over the years. Yet Gowon remained largely silent, rarely challenging many of the dominant narratives surrounding the war and the Aburi negotiations.
Now, at a time when history itself has become a battleground, his memoir appears less like a contribution to reconciliation and more like an attempt to reclaim control of a contested national memory.
One of the most controversial areas remains the Aburi Accord of January 1967, held in Ghana to prevent the collapse of Nigeria. The accord was meant to restructure Nigeria into a looser federation and restore trust between the regions. Historical accounts have long suggested that disagreements over interpretation and implementation led to its collapse. Critics argue that Gowon’s government later diluted key provisions through Decree No. 8, effectively undermining the spirit of the agreement.
Many historians maintain that Gowon, then a relatively inexperienced military ruler, lacked the constitutional depth and political sophistication required to fully grasp the implications of the accord and the forces surrounding him. Whether that criticism was entirely fair or not, the result was catastrophic: the failure of Aburi paved the way for war.
Yet even more troubling about his memoir are the omissions.
Any honest account of the Nigerian Civil War must begin with the massacres of Igbo civilians in Northern Nigeria in 1966. Those killings created fear, mistrust, and mass displacement that ultimately pushed the Eastern Region toward secession. For many Igbo families, the war did not begin with Biafra’s declaration; it began with bloodshed in the North and the inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government to stop it.
Gowon’s narrative blatantly pays insufficient attention to these foundational events, thereby presenting the war in isolation from the atrocities that triggered it. To discuss the war without fully confronting those killings risks presenting an incomplete and morally imbalanced history.
That is why this memoir is generating discomfort in many quarters, particularly among the Igbo. Nigeria is presently witnessing renewed efforts by younger generations to build broader coalitions across ethnic and regional lines. Many Igbo political actors are attempting to move beyond the bitterness of the civil war era and reposition themselves within a more inclusive national conversation ahead of future elections. Against that backdrop, Gowon’s memoir arrives at a deeply sensitive moment.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances. To many observers, it feels less like reflection and more like historical revisionism – an attempt to sanitize controversial decisions, soften accountability, and redefine public memory before history reaches its final verdict.
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths. Nigeria cannot genuinely move forward until it confronts the civil war with honesty, balance, and courage. Gowon had every right to tell his story. But timing matters, omissions matter, and history demands more than selective remembrance.
The Nigerian Civil War was not merely a military conflict. It was a human tragedy built on political failure, ethnic violence, broken agreements, and mutual distrust. Any account that minimizes those realities will always struggle for moral credibility, no matter how many years pass.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
“Nigeria reframed terrorism, corrected Washington’s lens, and secured cooperation —a pure anatomy of diplomatic turnaround“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
Nigeria’s recent engagement of a United States–based lobbying firm under a reported $9 million contract was widely scrutinized, predictably misunderstood by some, and quietly effective. The objective was clear: to shape Washington’s understanding of Nigeria’s complex security challenges—particularly violence affecting Christian communities—within an accurate geopolitical, intelligence, and regional framework. Such engagements are not unusual. In fact, they are a routine and essential feature of modern international diplomacy, allowing governments to clarify policy positions, counter distorted narratives, and ensure that domestic security crises are not flattened into simplistic talking points for foreign consumption.
In an era where global perception can influence aid, sanctions, military cooperation, and diplomatic goodwill, strategic communication has become inseparable from national security. Nigeria’s decision to professionally engage Washington signaled an understanding that security today is fought not only on the battlefield but also in briefing rooms, policy memos, and diplomatic corridors.
Evidence suggests that this recalibration has begun to yield results. Just days ago, former U.S. President Donald Trump publicly acknowledged—belatedly—that Muslims are equally among the primary victims of ISIS terrorism. It was a striking rhetorical shift for a political figure who had long leaned on broad, inflammatory framing that blurred the distinction between extremist violence and religious identity. That admission did not emerge in a vacuum. It followed sustained pressure from global security analysts, regional experts, and Muslim leaders who have repeatedly challenged the false narrative that terrorism is rooted in faith rather than criminal ideology, geopolitical instability, and organized violence.
More importantly, the acknowledgment coincided with tangible policy movement. Trump-aligned U.S. security networks have quietly expanded counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration. This development underscores a pragmatic recognition that effective counterterrorism is not achieved through threats, isolation, or performative rhetoric, but through partnership, intelligence sharing, and regional capacity building.
This week, the United States delivered fresh military supplies to Nigeria to support ongoing security operations. The delivery followed recent U.S. air strikes against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) targets, carried out at Nigeria’s formal request. While air strikes often attract public attention, the more consequential story lies beneath the surface: a shift toward coordinated intelligence operations, logistical support, and sustained military collaboration. This is not symbolic diplomacy. It is functional, operational alignment.
Contrast this moment with an earlier chapter in Nigeria–U.S. relations. During the Jonathan administration, Nigeria experienced significant difficulties in its diplomatic engagement with Washington. Rather than relying on seasoned foreign policy professionals, security strategists, and international communications experts, the government leaned heavily on local intermediaries and political loyalists to interpret and convey Nigeria’s position abroad. The result was a weakened diplomatic posture, fragmented messaging, and persistent misinterpretation of Nigeria’s internal security realities. Critical issues—ranging from Boko Haram’s evolution to regional insurgency dynamics—were often viewed through incomplete or distorted lenses.
That experience offered a lasting lesson: goodwill alone does not translate into influence. In global politics, perception must be managed as deliberately as policy. Strategic silence, amateur diplomacy, or reactive communication leaves a vacuum—one that is quickly filled by external narratives, advocacy groups, or political opportunists with their own agendas.
What has changed now is not merely tone, but method. Nigeria’s current approach reflects an understanding that diplomacy is not capitulation, and lobbying is not a sign of weakness. It is leverage. It is preparation. It is the disciplined articulation of national interest in a language that global power centers understand. By engaging professionally, Nigeria reframed its security narrative—not as a sectarian failure, but as a shared counterterrorism challenge that requires international coordination.
Even Donald Trump’s posture illustrates this transformation. A leader who once relied on threats, ultimatums, and rhetorical spectacle has now, through institutional channels, become part of a support framework working with regional actors to strengthen security and civilian protection. The shift is not ideological; it is a strategic move. And it reflects the enduring truth that diplomacy often succeeds where bluster fails.
In international politics, power is not only measured by firepower or economic weight, but by the ability to persuade, align, and sustain cooperation. Nigeria’s recent experience is a reminder that nations are not judged solely by their crises, but by how effectively they explain, manage, and confront them on the global stage. Diplomacy, when practiced with clarity and professionalism, does not dilute sovereignty—it reinforces it.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
Anthony Obi Ogbo
When Air Power Becomes a Christmas Performance: The Illusion of Success in Trump’s Nigerian Strike
“Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise.“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
When President Trump announced his authorized United States air strike against ISIL (ISIS) fighters in northwest Nigeria on Christmas Day, there was an immediate burst of celebration on Nigerian social media. For a country exhausted by years of kidnappings, massacres, and territorial insecurity, the announcement sounded like long-awaited international support. Memes circulated, praise poured in, and some Nigerians hailed Trump as a decisive global sheriff finally willing to act where others hesitated.
But after the initial euphoria settled, a sobering assessment emerged: the strike appeared less like a strategic military intervention and more like a made-for-television spectacle designed to burnish Trump’s international strongman image.
This was not the first time the United States has launched air strikes in Africa or the Sahel under the banner of counterterrorism. From Libya to Somalia, from Syria to Yemen, U.S. “precision strikes” have often been announced with confidence and celebrated with press briefings—only for the targeted groups to regroup, mutate, and, in some cases, expand their reach. In Nigeria itself, years of foreign-backed security assistance have failed to decisively neutralize Boko Haram or its ISIS-affiliated offshoots. Instead, violence has fragmented, spread, and grown more complex.
No verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated
The Nigerian strike followed a familiar pattern. U.S. officials framed it as a blow against ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP), a group aligned with the global ISIS network. Trump’s language suggested a decisive intervention—an act of muscular diplomacy signaling that America still projects power where it chooses. Yet no verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated, leadership structures dismantled, or operational capacity degraded.
What followed was a digital smokescreen. Social media accounts, many anonymous and unverified, began circulating gruesome images of dead bodies and destroyed villages—photos long associated with banditry in Nigeria’s northwest. These images were quickly repurposed to “prove” the success of Trump’s strike. However, this is where the narrative falls apart under scrutiny.
Trump’s mission, as publicly stated, was to target ISIS. Not bandits. Not kidnappers. Not rural criminal gangs. ISIS is a transnational terrorist organization with ideological, financial, and operational links across continents. Bandits, by contrast, are primarily armed criminal groups—motivated by ransom, cattle theft, and territorial control, not global jihad. Conflating the two may be politically convenient, but it is analytically dishonest.
Killing or displacing bandits does not equate to dismantling ISIS. In fact, indiscriminate or poorly targeted air strikes often worsen the situation, pushing criminal groups to radicalize, splinter, or align with extremist factions for protection and legitimacy. This pattern has been observed repeatedly in conflict zones where military force substitutes for intelligence-driven strategy.
A truly successful counterterrorism raid is not measured by dramatic announcements or viral images. It is measured by clear, verifiable outcomes, including the confirmed elimination of high-ranking commanders, disruption of recruitment and financing networks, seizure of weapons caches, and—most importantly—sustained reductions in civilian attacks. None of these benchmarks has been credibly demonstrated in the aftermath of Trump’s Nigerian air strike.
Instead, Nigeria wakes up to the same grim reality: villages remain vulnerable, highways unsafe, and communities terrorized. The strike did not change the security equation. It did not empower Nigerian forces. It did not restore civilian confidence. And it certainly did not neutralize ISIS as a strategic threat.
This air strike offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
In that sense, the air strike was not merely ineffective—it was a failure dressed in the language of strength, executed for optics, and amplified for political gain. It offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
If the goal is truly to eliminate ISIS and its affiliates in West Africa, the path is neither theatrical nor unilateral. It requires robust intelligence sharing, sustained training, and real-time coordination with Nigerian and regional forces. It demands targeted arms assistance, logistical support, and investments in surveillance capabilities that allow local militaries to act decisively and lawfully. Above all, it requires a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity—not fleeting air shows announced from afar.
Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise. And celebration without results is self-deception. Trump’s Nigerian air strike may have produced headlines, but history will remember it for what it was: a failed mission masquerading as success.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us