Connect with us

Nigeria

Nigeria: Resolving the so-called ‘Igbo Problem’

Published

on

To paraphrase Karl Marx, there is a spectre haunting Nigeria – the spectre of disintegration. At no time has the presence of this spectre being so palpably felt than in the last three months.

Every day, the front pages of Nigeria’s newspapers are filled with reports of abductions, kidnappings for ransom, political assassinations, etc. Rather than design and promulgate policies to arrest the deterioration, President Buhari and his aides have been busy searching for people and groups to blame. It is clear to any objective observer that the president has lost control of the country.

Biafra is an idea, a dream, founded on a shared sense of loss, grief and victimhood.

The Indigenous People of Biafra

Of all the groups alleged to be threatening Nigeria at the moment, none appears to be causing as much concern to the current administration as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a radical breakaway faction of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) – an openly secessionist movement whose aim is to “restore the independent state of Biafra” in the mainly Igbo-speaking south-east region.

IPOB is not the only secessionist movement in Nigeria; there is also one in the west – the Oodua Republic movement. Technically, Boko Haram, the extremist Islamic group that has terrorised the northeastern part of Nigeria for more than a decade with aims to create an Islamic State in the territory of Nigeria, is another secessionist group. But none vexes the Nigerian government and some elements in northern Nigeria like IPOB and the Igbo tribe.

For many jobless, disenfranchised jobless Igbo youth, Biafra has become an idea, a dream, an imagined better place than a Nigeria that has shuttered opportunities for them. Unfortunately, Nigerian authorities and Igbo leaders have failed to recogniSe the new meaning of Biafra as an idea, an aspiration, similar in emotive power as “Next year in Jerusalem” was and remains for Jews all over the world.

Biafra is an idea, a dream, founded on a shared sense of loss, grief and victimhood. IPOB, driven by this idea, is seen by Nigerian authorities as a strong challenge to the state.

The agitation for Biafra as the most visible expression of the endless but legitimate complaints by Igbo of marginalisation by Nigeria has created what I would call the “Igbo problem.”

The “Igbo problem”

Some commentators have argued that the “Igbo problem” was created by the Igbo themselves – that it is an injury that Igbos inflicted on themselves by staging the first coup d’état in 1966 and then trying to secede from the federation, leading the country to wage war against them.

According to these commentators, the Igbo Problem dates back to January 1966 and the civil war that followed. Perhaps so. However, this view has elements of revisionism. There were pogroms against Ndi’igbo (Igbo people) way before Nigeria became an independent country.

No one will win the argument about which ethnic group is accountable or responsible for the many difficulties of Nigeria and its failure thus far to be a successful country. A debate about the incompetence of the current federal government has quickly degenerated to one of mutual hurling of insults across ethnic lines.

Nigeria is not working for most Nigerians.

All ethnic groups are affected by the poor state of governance in Nigeria today and are protesting. The most intriguing thing is the discriminatory attitude of the federal government to particular protests and other threats to the integrity of the country.

Killings by Fulani herdsmen appears to be tolerable but protests by IPOB about the status (and conditions) of Ndi’igbo in Nigeria are without hesitation classified as a threat of the highest level to national security by the current administration.

The agitation in the south-east is now presented by some sections of the country as worse than the longstanding brutal, extremist Islamic insurgency in the north-east, as well as the unbridled banditry and the modern-day inter-tribal wars in southern Kaduna and Plateau State.

Hostages of the Nigerian state and economy, some Igbo “leaders” have condemned IPOB and its paramilitary wing –  Eastern Security Network (ESN), much more vehemently and unreservedly than many northern Nigeria leaders have condemned Boko Haram in ten years.

Nigeria is not working for most Nigerians. Many of the youth, whether Igbo, Yoruba, Izon, or Tivi, do not see any future in the country. Those able to leaving. There has to be a stop to this under-performance. If something is not working, it is futile to continue to expend precious and scarce time and resources on it.

How can Nigeria work?

One way to get Nigeria to work for Nigerians could be for “Nigerians” who hate Ndi’igbo to just expel them since they are believed by some powerful segments to be the country’s problem.

There is no reason to continue to co-habit the same political space with “irritants, endless agitators, criminals, and impossible-to-satisfy-secessionists” as some northern Nigerian groups have described Ndi’igbo. The expulsion of Ndi’Igbo from Nigeria could be by a vote in both houses of the National Assembly,

No referendum would be required. Convene a joint session of the National Assembly and take an up and down vote on whether Ndi’Igbo should continue to be a part of Nigeria.Expulsion will be an infinitely better option than another civil war. A vote in the National Assembly will infinitely cost less in terms of lives and treasure than a referendum.

There is no profit in staying in a toxic relationship and hoping that it will, perhaps by the grace of God, improve sometime in the future.

History provides some examples of successful expulsions of “irritant” communities. On 9 August 1965, Malaysia expelled Singapore and it is today a very successful economy, as is Malaysia.The Chinese Communist Party expelled the Kuomintang to Taiwan, and both mainland China and Taiwan have done well. The list goes on.

Nigeria will be “much better, more cohesive and prosperous, more focused without Ndi’igbo.” All the recent anti-Igbo statements from high-ranking officials in the Buhari administration suggest it could be.

Nigeria should thus let the Ndi’igbo go peacefully so that it can focus on building a much greater and better Nigeria. That would be the best thing to do under the current circumstances. It is certainly better than operating a suboptimal entity lacking in mutual trust with endless hurling of recriminations and antagonisms.

This is not a radical idea. I am proposing a feasible solution to a seemingly endless/intractable problem. There is no profit in staying in a toxic relationship and hoping that it will, perhaps by the grace of God, improve sometime in the future. There is no point in hoping for this as the national leadership is not making any good faith effort in that direction. Nigeria will not progress as fast as it ought to as long as the Igbo “continue to hold her down with their never-ending irritating conduct.”

Nigeria, since she appears unwilling to grant Ndi’igbo full citizenship rights, should have the courage to bring a peaceful end to the “Igbo problem”. Either accept Ndi’igbo as Nigerians with the full prerogatives, rights and responsibilities of citizenship, or expel them from the federation – let them go to either succeed or fail.

And note, just as Israel has not succeeded in subduing Hamas by force, so the Buhari administration will be unable to subdue IPOB. The reason is simple – Biafra is an idea and the only way to counter an idea is with a superior idea.

The federal government must make a strong case for Nigerian unity. The Buhari administration perhaps thinks that asserting that the unity of Nigeria is non-negotiable is sufficient. It deludes itself. It should look at the USSR, former Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia and the ongoing efforts by Scotland to secede from the UK after more than 300 years of union.

Bottom line

The decision of the federal government to direct the Nigerian armed forces to bomb Eastern Nigeria to flush out the abominable secessionist IPOB is unwarranted and unfair.

It exposes everyone in the region to military action. Yet not every Igbo is in IPOB/ESN or even a sympathiser. It is also resulting in the loss of life and assets and cannot therefore be an idea superior to the idea of “Biafra, a state of our own where we will be treated with dignity and respect as full citizens.”

One Nigeria is increasingly a tall challenge because the idea does not hold great appeal for many young people from the south of the country, especially Igbo youth. Do not get me wrong: I do not advocate the splintering of Nigeria into separate sovereignties. I want a united, progressive and stable Nigeria.

I want to remain Nigerian. But it must be a Nigeria that works for everyone, for all of us, a Nigeria where everyone’s right to full citizenship is not abridged or circumscribed in any way, either wittingly or unwittingly by race, religion, or ethnicity or by the government; a Nigeria with constituent parts that are respectful of each other.

A Nigeria that fails to guarantee full citizenship rights to all its citizens will remain an arena of endless protests and conflicts. And that Nigeria is unlikely to achieve her potentials and arrive at her destiny.

Culled from the Africa Report

Texas Guardian News

Books

The Color of Memory: A Rescue Mission in Print

Published

on

  • Book Title: Abiriba Calendar of Events: Past and Present.
  • Author: Dr. Nwojo Kalu Ugah and Prof. Igwe Ebe Udeh, PhD.
  • Publishers:  MIDIUN GROUP INC.
  • Reviewer: Emeaba Onuma Emeaba.
  • Pages: 129.

History is often a silent, monochromatic affair—a collection of graying facts relegated to the dusty corners of the academy. But every so often, a work arrives that refuses to let the past remain quiet. In their latest volume, Abiriba Calendar of Events: Past and Present, Dr. Nwojo Kalu Ugah and Prof. Igwe Ebe Udeh, PhD, do more than document a region; they stage a sensory intervention. Through a marriage of historical rigor and lively visual storytelling, the authors transform what might have been a static archive into a pulsing, audible record of the Abiriba people.

The importance of this intervention cannot be overstated. As a long-standing observer of the region’s social fabric, I find that this work stands as a thoughtful and valuable contribution to the documentation of Abiriba’s history, institutions, and cultural philosophy. It will serve both scholars and future generations as an important record of the distinctive republican heritage of the Abiriba people. It is a sentiment echoed throughout the three pages of glowing commendations that preface the text, where community titans and political leaders unite to praise a volume that has clearly become a communal milestone.

Dr. Ugah and Dr. Udeh’s most striking achievement is the “physicality” of the narrative. The book is heavily illustrated with archival photographs, many of which have been meticulously restored and brought into vivid color. By injecting color into the black-and-white silhouettes of the past, the authors collapse the distance between the contemporary reader and the historical subject. These images are literal and evidentiary; they do not merely “decorate” the text but are woven directly into the paragraphs. As the eye moves from a description of a festival to a photograph of dancers in mid-motion, the prose begins to hum.

However, the book’s unwavering devotion to preservation occasionally veers into the hagiographic. By focusing so intently on the “lively” and the “republican,” the authors sometimes sidestep the more uncomfortable frictions between these ancient rites and the complexities of the twenty-first century. One wishes for a more rigorous interrogation of how these traditions—some rooted in rigid social hierarchies or exclusionary practices—survive the scrutiny of a modern, globalized generation. At times, the narrative feels like a rescue mission so concerned with saving the artifacts that it forgets to ask whether the culture itself can sustain the weight of its own history without significant evolution. This idealistic lens, while beautiful, can occasionally obscure the very real internal conflicts that define a living, breathing community.

Despite this leaning toward the ideal, the book’s “sound” remains undeniable. The authors’ meticulous approach to sensory details suggests a profound sensitivity to the mechanics of cultural memory. By documenting the “snoring and bellowing” of the village drums—the ufĩẽ and the ikoro—with such granular detail, they transcend mere description. We see maidens of Am̃anta village daintily dressed for the Obina dance and Ukpo youths clothed in green ẹkọrọ weeds, and in doing so, we hear the pulse of the marketplace and the rhythm of the festival.

The volume’s sensory immersion is matched by its structural precision. Dr. Ugah and Dr. Udeh have included a comprehensive glossary of Abiriba terms, complete with English translations, ensuring that the “sound” of the culture is decoded for the uninitiated. This appendix is more than a utilitarian tool; it is a vital act of cultural rescue. By documenting the specific vocabulary of the month of Iri Am̃a or the legal principles of Onye Parị Ọba, the authors provide a permanent bridge between oral traditions and the written record.

In an era where history is often flattened by the passage of time, Dr. Ugah and Dr. Udeh have added depth and dimension back to the record. By the final page, the reader is left with the sense that they haven’t just read a history; they have witnessed a revival. They have ensured that, for the Abiriba people, the past will no longer be seen in shades of gray and will certainly no longer be silent.

_________

♦ Dr. Emeaba, the author of “A Dictionary of Literature,” writes dime novels in the style of the Onitsha Market Literature sub-genre.

Texas Guardian News
Continue Reading

Africa

U.S. Signals More Strikes in Nigeria as Abuja Confirms Joint Military Campaign

Published

on

The United States has warned that further airstrikes against Islamic State targets in north-western Nigeria are imminent, as Nigerian officials confirmed that recent attacks were part of coordinated operations between both countries.

The warning came hours after U.S. forces struck militant camps in Sokoto State, an operation President Donald Trump publicly framed as a response to what he described as the killing of Christians in Nigeria. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the strikes were only the beginning.

“The president was clear last month: the killing of innocent Christians in Nigeria (and elsewhere) must end,” Hegseth wrote on X. “The Pentagon is always ready, so ISIS found out tonight—on Christmas. More to come. Grateful for Nigerian government support & cooperation.”

Nigeria’s foreign minister, Yusuf Tuggar, confirmed on Friday that the strikes were carried out as part of “joint ongoing operations,” pushing back against earlier tensions sparked by Trump’s public criticism of Nigeria’s handling of insecurity.

The airstrikes followed a brief diplomatic rift after Trump accused Nigeria’s government of failing to protect Christians from militant violence. Nigerian officials responded by reiterating that extremist groups in the country target both Christians and Muslims, and that the conflict is driven by insurgency and criminality rather than religious persecution.

Speaking to Channels Television, Tuggar said Nigeria provided intelligence support for the strikes in Sokoto and described close coordination with Washington. He said he spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio for nearly 20 minutes before briefing President Bola Tinubu and receiving approval to proceed, followed by another call with Rubio to finalize arrangements.

“We have been working closely with the Americans,” Tuggar said. “This is what we’ve always been hoping for—to work together to combat terrorism and stop the deaths of innocent Nigerians. It’s a collaborative effort.”

U.S. Africa Command later confirmed that the strikes were conducted in coordination with Nigerian authorities. An earlier statement, later removed, had suggested the operation was carried out at Nigeria’s request.

Trump, speaking in an interview with Politico, said the operation had originally been scheduled for Wednesday but was delayed at his instruction. “They were going to do it earlier,” he said. “And I said, ‘Nope, let’s give a Christmas present.’ They didn’t think that was coming, but we hit them hard. Every camp got decimated.”

Neither the U.S. nor Nigerian authorities have disclosed casualty figures or confirmed whether militants were killed. Tuggar, when asked whether additional strikes were planned, said only: “You can call it a new phase of an old conflict. For us, this is ongoing.”

Nigeria is officially a secular state, with a population split roughly between Muslims and Christians. While violence against Christian communities has drawn increasing attention from religious conservatives in the United States, Nigeria’s government maintains that extremist groups operate without regard to faith, attacking civilians across religious lines.

Trump’s public rhetoric contrasts with his 2024 campaign messaging, in which he cast himself as a “candidate of peace” who would pull the United States out of what he called endless foreign wars. Yet his second term has already seen expanded U.S. military action abroad, including strikes in Yemen, Iran, and Syria, as well as a significant military buildup in the Caribbean directed at Venezuela.

On the ground in Sokoto State, residents of Jabo village—near one of the strike sites—reported panic and confusion as missiles hit nearby areas. Local residents said no casualties had been recorded, but security forces quickly sealed off the area.

“As it approached our area, the heat became intense,” Abubakar Sani told the Associated Press. “The government should take appropriate measures to protect us. We have never experienced anything like this before.”

Another resident, farmer Sanusi Madabo, said the night sky glowed red for hours. “It was almost like daytime,” he said. “We only learned later that it was a U.S. airstrike.”

For now, both Washington and Abuja are projecting unity. Whether the strikes mark a sustained shift in strategy—or another brief escalation in a long war—remains unclear.

Texas Guardian News
Continue Reading

Africa

Nigeria–Burkina Faso Rift: Military Power, Mistrust, and a Region Out of Balance

Published

on

The brief detention of a Nigerian Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and its crew in Burkina Faso may have ended quietly, but it exposed a deeper rift shaped by mistrust, insecurity, and uneven military power in West Africa. What was officially a technical emergency landing quickly became a diplomatic and security flashpoint, reflecting not hostility between equals, but anxiety between unequally matched states navigating very different political realities.

On December 8, 2025, the Nigerian Air Force transport aircraft made an unscheduled landing in Bobo-Dioulasso while en route to Portugal. Nigerian authorities described the stop as a precautionary response to a technical fault—standard procedure under international aviation and military safety protocols. Burkina Faso acknowledged the emergency landing but emphasized that the aircraft had violated its airspace, prompting the temporary detention of 11 Nigerian personnel while investigations and repairs were conducted. Within days, the crew and aircraft were released, underscoring a professional, if tense, resolution.

Yet the symbolism mattered. In a Sahel region gripped by coups, insurgencies, and fragile legitimacy, airspace is not merely technical—it is political. Burkina Faso’s reaction reflected a state on edge, hyper-vigilant about sovereignty amid persistent internal threats. Nigeria’s response, measured and restrained, reflected confidence rooted in capacity.

The military imbalance between the two countries is stark. Nigeria fields one of Africa’s most formidable armed forces, with a tri-service structure that includes a large, well-equipped air force, a dominant regional navy, and a sizable army capable of sustained operations. The Nigerian Air Force operates fighter jets such as the JF-17 and F-7Ni, as well as A-29 Super Tucanos for counterinsurgency operations, heavy transport aircraft like the C-130, and an extensive helicopter fleet. This force is designed not only for internal security but for regional power projection and multinational operations.

Burkina Faso’s military, by contrast, is compact and narrowly focused. Its air arm relies on a limited number of light attack aircraft, including Super Tucanos, and a small helicopter fleet primarily dedicated to internal counterinsurgency. There is no navy, no strategic airlift capacity comparable to Nigeria’s, and limited logistical depth. The Burkinabè military is stretched thin, fighting multiple insurgent groups while also managing the political consequences of repeated military takeovers.

This imbalance shapes behavior. Nigeria’s military posture is institutional, outward-looking, and anchored in regional frameworks such as ECOWAS. Burkina Faso’s posture is defensive, reactive, and inward-facing. Where Nigeria seeks stability through deterrence and cooperation, Burkina Faso seeks survival amid constant internal pressure. That difference explains why a technical landing could be perceived as a “serious security breach” rather than a routine aviation incident.

The incident also illuminates why Burkina Faso continues to struggle to regain political balance. Repeated coups have eroded civilian institutions, fractured command structures, and blurred the line between governance and militarization. The armed forces are not just security actors; they are political stakeholders. This creates a cycle where insecurity justifies military rule, and military rule deepens insecurity by weakening democratic legitimacy and regional trust.

Nigeria, despite its own security challenges, has managed to avoid this spiral. Civilian control of the military remains intact, democratic transitions—however imperfect—continue, and its armed forces operate within a clearer constitutional framework. This stability enhances Nigeria’s regional credibility and amplifies its military superiority beyond hardware alone.

The C-130 episode did not escalate into confrontation precisely because of this asymmetry. Burkina Faso could assert sovereignty, but not sustain defiance. Nigeria could have asserted its capability, but chose restraint. In the end, professionalism prevailed.

Still, the rift lingers. It is not about one aircraft or one landing, but about two countries moving in different strategic directions. Nigeria stands as a regional anchor with superior military power and institutional depth. Burkina Faso remains a state searching for equilibrium—politically fragile, militarily constrained, and acutely sensitive to every perceived threat from the skies above.

Texas Guardian News
Continue Reading

Trending