Column
My thoughts about Femi Falana and his position on Yoruba Self determination
Many people like Falana are merely protecting their own investments in Abuja. NLC, ASUU, and labour bureaucrats wont want Nigeria to break up because of dues and the perks and privileges they enjoy.
The problem with some Marxists and human rights activists is that they fail to understand their own history. They speak on pages of newspapers but are far from the tough and deadly challenges of the ordinary Yoruba person. Let Falana go to his village and speak, you won’t see up to 100 people. He contested election as Ekiti Governor and was defeated in his own local Govt in 2007.
People like Falan have the illusion that ethnic groups cannot manage their own affairs, they gloss over International laws on self-determination drafted after two bitter world wars by United Nations and informed by experiences of ethnic conflict all over the world.
Falana wrongly assumes a country is great only when it is big whereas the greatest countries on earth are indeed smaller countries: Finaland, Norway, France, Iceland, UAE etc. He is talking of Nigeria as the biggest black country in earth and so what? A foolish man thinks of his honour and wealth is by having 100 children eventhough they are not educated, unkempt and fight and kill each other daily. A wise man is contended with 3 or 4 children all that are decent, disciplined and well trained. India is big with 1b people but full of poverty but Israel is small and prosperous. Egypt is full of crisis and its about 90 million but UAE is 4 million and more prosperous. What are you doing with a country of 200m that is filled with blood, misery and death? Nigeria is biggest black country and the biggest embarrassment to black civilization.
Falana and his group place economy at the centre of all things and are blind to the historic clash of civilizations, of values, of faith, to language, to culture and to ideas which is responsible for calamities in Africa.
I knew Falana is dishonest when I watched him say he did a research and discovered majority of kidnappers are Yoruba. What a disgracefully dishonest man. You want to protect your wealth and your clients–politicians at all cost. Few days after his interview, Sultan can up to say 80 percent of kidnappers are Fulani. Falana was forced to wag his tail and shut up. As the struggle continues, it will expose our friends and enemies. Anyone benefiting from a system will not want to see the system die. If Falana so much love Yoruba, what single thing has he done for Yoruba people? Afe Babalola built Hospitals and schools. Gani Fawehinmi gave scholarship to thousands of students. What is Falana’s mission except primitive accumulation of wealth. He is one of the greatest beneficiaries from a rotten and ignoble country.
Remember he was Alamaiseigha’s lawyer. How much was he paid?
How can you talk of a country when you don’t even have communities to live? Yoruba communities are occupied by armed terrorists, why didn’t Falana go to court? Of all the Yoruba people kidnapped why didn’t Falana chambers go to court? Why didn’t Falana write to UN and ECOWAS on invasion of Yoruba territories?
It is wrong to say those demanding for self-determination want to transfer national repression to local repression.
Awo and Action Group have proved this to be totally wrong. Singapore, Pakistan, Eritrea, Finland, Denmark have proved this to be false.
Falana doesn’t have a solution to slavery. He and his group don’t have a solution to kidnapping, banditry, hijack of Yoruba resources and terrorist invasion of Yorubaland. He does not want to support Yoruba struggle yet he is a billionaire. He should leave us alone. He should be ashamed. He should ask himself why his radical Fulani colleagues are behind their own people but he wants to be Nigerian hero? Why can’t he go and live in Sokoto or Zamfara just for two weeks? Why can’t he travel to his Ilawe village by road? He now goes by air to Akure and he has police escort.
Many people like Falana are merely protecting their own investments in Abuja. NLC, ASUU, and labour bureaucrats won’t want Nigeria to break up because of dues and the perks and privileges they enjoy.
Many lawyers will prefer to have Nigeria retained simply because of their clients across the country. Nigeria has become a carcass that all sorts of vultures parading themselves as messiah want to feed on. The lawyers, judges, make a living from electoral tribunals and the defence of thieves who have stolen public funds make many lawyers become billionaire overnight.
Politicians live on illicit funds. They know Yoruba Nation will make all these very difficult.
It is on this basis they come up with all sorts of mischievous and self-serving arguments to defend Nigeria and its falling pillars.
But the wind has blown and we have seen the ass of the fowl. It is too late for them. The game is up.
♦Alh Mrs Medinat Oladimeji is the spokeswoman of Oodua Republic a Yoruba Self-determination group.
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths—Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo
More than five decades after the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970, former Head of State Yakubu Gowon has finally offered his own detailed account of the conflict that permanently reshaped Nigeria. Gowon, who became Nigeria’s leader in 1966 after the counter-coup that followed the assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, presided over the most tragic chapter in the nation’s history—the Biafran War that claimed millions of lives, many of them civilians. Ironically, the same military establishment that elevated him during the crisis later removed him from power in 1975 while he attended an OAU summit in Uganda.
His long-awaited memoir has reopened old wounds and revived unresolved questions about the war, the collapse of the Aburi Accord, and the decades-long collective silence that followed the conflict. The biggest question, however, is this: why now?
Why did Gowon wait more than fifty years after the war to tell his side of the story, especially when nearly all the principal actors are gone? Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu published multiple accounts and speeches in defense of Biafra and in criticism of the federal government’s handling of the crisis. Former military leaders and participants also documented their perspectives over the years. Yet Gowon remained largely silent, rarely challenging many of the dominant narratives surrounding the war and the Aburi negotiations.
Now, at a time when history itself has become a battleground, his memoir appears less like a contribution to reconciliation and more like an attempt to reclaim control of a contested national memory.
One of the most controversial areas remains the Aburi Accord of January 1967, held in Ghana to prevent the collapse of Nigeria. The accord was meant to restructure Nigeria into a looser federation and restore trust between the regions. Historical accounts have long suggested that disagreements over interpretation and implementation led to its collapse. Critics argue that Gowon’s government later diluted key provisions through Decree No. 8, effectively undermining the spirit of the agreement.
Many historians maintain that Gowon, then a relatively inexperienced military ruler, lacked the constitutional depth and political sophistication required to fully grasp the implications of the accord and the forces surrounding him. Whether that criticism was entirely fair or not, the result was catastrophic: the failure of Aburi paved the way for war.
Yet even more troubling about his memoir are the omissions.
Any honest account of the Nigerian Civil War must begin with the massacres of Igbo civilians in Northern Nigeria in 1966. Those killings created fear, mistrust, and mass displacement that ultimately pushed the Eastern Region toward secession. For many Igbo families, the war did not begin with Biafra’s declaration; it began with bloodshed in the North and the inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government to stop it.
Gowon’s narrative blatantly pays insufficient attention to these foundational events, thereby presenting the war in isolation from the atrocities that triggered it. To discuss the war without fully confronting those killings risks presenting an incomplete and morally imbalanced history.
That is why this memoir is generating discomfort in many quarters, particularly among the Igbo. Nigeria is presently witnessing renewed efforts by younger generations to build broader coalitions across ethnic and regional lines. Many Igbo political actors are attempting to move beyond the bitterness of the civil war era and reposition themselves within a more inclusive national conversation ahead of future elections. Against that backdrop, Gowon’s memoir arrives at a deeply sensitive moment.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances. To many observers, it feels less like reflection and more like historical revisionism – an attempt to sanitize controversial decisions, soften accountability, and redefine public memory before history reaches its final verdict.
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths. Nigeria cannot genuinely move forward until it confronts the civil war with honesty, balance, and courage. Gowon had every right to tell his story. But timing matters, omissions matter, and history demands more than selective remembrance.
The Nigerian Civil War was not merely a military conflict. It was a human tragedy built on political failure, ethnic violence, broken agreements, and mutual distrust. Any account that minimizes those realities will always struggle for moral credibility, no matter how many years pass.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
“Nigeria reframed terrorism, corrected Washington’s lens, and secured cooperation —a pure anatomy of diplomatic turnaround“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
Nigeria’s recent engagement of a United States–based lobbying firm under a reported $9 million contract was widely scrutinized, predictably misunderstood by some, and quietly effective. The objective was clear: to shape Washington’s understanding of Nigeria’s complex security challenges—particularly violence affecting Christian communities—within an accurate geopolitical, intelligence, and regional framework. Such engagements are not unusual. In fact, they are a routine and essential feature of modern international diplomacy, allowing governments to clarify policy positions, counter distorted narratives, and ensure that domestic security crises are not flattened into simplistic talking points for foreign consumption.
In an era where global perception can influence aid, sanctions, military cooperation, and diplomatic goodwill, strategic communication has become inseparable from national security. Nigeria’s decision to professionally engage Washington signaled an understanding that security today is fought not only on the battlefield but also in briefing rooms, policy memos, and diplomatic corridors.
Evidence suggests that this recalibration has begun to yield results. Just days ago, former U.S. President Donald Trump publicly acknowledged—belatedly—that Muslims are equally among the primary victims of ISIS terrorism. It was a striking rhetorical shift for a political figure who had long leaned on broad, inflammatory framing that blurred the distinction between extremist violence and religious identity. That admission did not emerge in a vacuum. It followed sustained pressure from global security analysts, regional experts, and Muslim leaders who have repeatedly challenged the false narrative that terrorism is rooted in faith rather than criminal ideology, geopolitical instability, and organized violence.
More importantly, the acknowledgment coincided with tangible policy movement. Trump-aligned U.S. security networks have quietly expanded counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration. This development underscores a pragmatic recognition that effective counterterrorism is not achieved through threats, isolation, or performative rhetoric, but through partnership, intelligence sharing, and regional capacity building.
This week, the United States delivered fresh military supplies to Nigeria to support ongoing security operations. The delivery followed recent U.S. air strikes against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) targets, carried out at Nigeria’s formal request. While air strikes often attract public attention, the more consequential story lies beneath the surface: a shift toward coordinated intelligence operations, logistical support, and sustained military collaboration. This is not symbolic diplomacy. It is functional, operational alignment.
Contrast this moment with an earlier chapter in Nigeria–U.S. relations. During the Jonathan administration, Nigeria experienced significant difficulties in its diplomatic engagement with Washington. Rather than relying on seasoned foreign policy professionals, security strategists, and international communications experts, the government leaned heavily on local intermediaries and political loyalists to interpret and convey Nigeria’s position abroad. The result was a weakened diplomatic posture, fragmented messaging, and persistent misinterpretation of Nigeria’s internal security realities. Critical issues—ranging from Boko Haram’s evolution to regional insurgency dynamics—were often viewed through incomplete or distorted lenses.
That experience offered a lasting lesson: goodwill alone does not translate into influence. In global politics, perception must be managed as deliberately as policy. Strategic silence, amateur diplomacy, or reactive communication leaves a vacuum—one that is quickly filled by external narratives, advocacy groups, or political opportunists with their own agendas.
What has changed now is not merely tone, but method. Nigeria’s current approach reflects an understanding that diplomacy is not capitulation, and lobbying is not a sign of weakness. It is leverage. It is preparation. It is the disciplined articulation of national interest in a language that global power centers understand. By engaging professionally, Nigeria reframed its security narrative—not as a sectarian failure, but as a shared counterterrorism challenge that requires international coordination.
Even Donald Trump’s posture illustrates this transformation. A leader who once relied on threats, ultimatums, and rhetorical spectacle has now, through institutional channels, become part of a support framework working with regional actors to strengthen security and civilian protection. The shift is not ideological; it is a strategic move. And it reflects the enduring truth that diplomacy often succeeds where bluster fails.
In international politics, power is not only measured by firepower or economic weight, but by the ability to persuade, align, and sustain cooperation. Nigeria’s recent experience is a reminder that nations are not judged solely by their crises, but by how effectively they explain, manage, and confront them on the global stage. Diplomacy, when practiced with clarity and professionalism, does not dilute sovereignty—it reinforces it.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
Anthony Obi Ogbo
When Air Power Becomes a Christmas Performance: The Illusion of Success in Trump’s Nigerian Strike
“Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise.“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
When President Trump announced his authorized United States air strike against ISIL (ISIS) fighters in northwest Nigeria on Christmas Day, there was an immediate burst of celebration on Nigerian social media. For a country exhausted by years of kidnappings, massacres, and territorial insecurity, the announcement sounded like long-awaited international support. Memes circulated, praise poured in, and some Nigerians hailed Trump as a decisive global sheriff finally willing to act where others hesitated.
But after the initial euphoria settled, a sobering assessment emerged: the strike appeared less like a strategic military intervention and more like a made-for-television spectacle designed to burnish Trump’s international strongman image.
This was not the first time the United States has launched air strikes in Africa or the Sahel under the banner of counterterrorism. From Libya to Somalia, from Syria to Yemen, U.S. “precision strikes” have often been announced with confidence and celebrated with press briefings—only for the targeted groups to regroup, mutate, and, in some cases, expand their reach. In Nigeria itself, years of foreign-backed security assistance have failed to decisively neutralize Boko Haram or its ISIS-affiliated offshoots. Instead, violence has fragmented, spread, and grown more complex.
No verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated
The Nigerian strike followed a familiar pattern. U.S. officials framed it as a blow against ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP), a group aligned with the global ISIS network. Trump’s language suggested a decisive intervention—an act of muscular diplomacy signaling that America still projects power where it chooses. Yet no verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated, leadership structures dismantled, or operational capacity degraded.
What followed was a digital smokescreen. Social media accounts, many anonymous and unverified, began circulating gruesome images of dead bodies and destroyed villages—photos long associated with banditry in Nigeria’s northwest. These images were quickly repurposed to “prove” the success of Trump’s strike. However, this is where the narrative falls apart under scrutiny.
Trump’s mission, as publicly stated, was to target ISIS. Not bandits. Not kidnappers. Not rural criminal gangs. ISIS is a transnational terrorist organization with ideological, financial, and operational links across continents. Bandits, by contrast, are primarily armed criminal groups—motivated by ransom, cattle theft, and territorial control, not global jihad. Conflating the two may be politically convenient, but it is analytically dishonest.
Killing or displacing bandits does not equate to dismantling ISIS. In fact, indiscriminate or poorly targeted air strikes often worsen the situation, pushing criminal groups to radicalize, splinter, or align with extremist factions for protection and legitimacy. This pattern has been observed repeatedly in conflict zones where military force substitutes for intelligence-driven strategy.
A truly successful counterterrorism raid is not measured by dramatic announcements or viral images. It is measured by clear, verifiable outcomes, including the confirmed elimination of high-ranking commanders, disruption of recruitment and financing networks, seizure of weapons caches, and—most importantly—sustained reductions in civilian attacks. None of these benchmarks has been credibly demonstrated in the aftermath of Trump’s Nigerian air strike.
Instead, Nigeria wakes up to the same grim reality: villages remain vulnerable, highways unsafe, and communities terrorized. The strike did not change the security equation. It did not empower Nigerian forces. It did not restore civilian confidence. And it certainly did not neutralize ISIS as a strategic threat.
This air strike offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
In that sense, the air strike was not merely ineffective—it was a failure dressed in the language of strength, executed for optics, and amplified for political gain. It offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
If the goal is truly to eliminate ISIS and its affiliates in West Africa, the path is neither theatrical nor unilateral. It requires robust intelligence sharing, sustained training, and real-time coordination with Nigerian and regional forces. It demands targeted arms assistance, logistical support, and investments in surveillance capabilities that allow local militaries to act decisively and lawfully. Above all, it requires a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity—not fleeting air shows announced from afar.
Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise. And celebration without results is self-deception. Trump’s Nigerian air strike may have produced headlines, but history will remember it for what it was: a failed mission masquerading as success.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
Gowon’s Book and the Dangerous Politics of Selective Memory
TSU’s CommWeek Positions School of Communication at the Forefront of AI, Innovation, and Student Success
Report Indicates Africa faces growth slowdown due to war on Iran
Emotional Conflict: Is She Toying with Me?
Corruption at the Nigerian Consulate Atlanta – A Victim’s Nightmarish Experience
Gowon’s Book and the Dangerous Politics of Selective Memory
Video: Omambala Cultural Association in Houston Celebrates Motherhood with Joyous Igbo-Inspired Mother’s Day Event
VIDEO: Chris Hollins Opens Cartoon Art Showcase at TSU’s CommWeek
