Nigeria
Why Buhari Lost And It May Never Be Regained By Anymore
Published
5 years agoon
By Rudolf Okonkwo — Guest Columnist
This week, I went back to watch an April 12, 2015, interview that I had with the then-President-elect Muhammadu Buhari.
After watching the interview, I arrived at a clear conclusion: It was all Olusegun Obasanjo’s fault.
Nigeria’s final chance to revive itself, to be a fair, decent, and just nation, came in 1999. Posterity called on Olusegun Obasanjo, who came out of prison with a new lease on life, to do Nigeria the honor. But Obasanjo failed.
On January 29, 2004, as Obasanjo was entering his fifth year in office, still pursuing shadows, I wrote an article on Nigeriaworld.com titled: Why Obasanjo Failed.
At that point, I had determined that Obasanjo was more interested in building a castle in the sand. There was Obasanjo, a president who had a rare chance to transform Nigeria permanently. But Obasanjo lived in Eldorado, interested in turning Nigeria into South Korea when Nigeria’s foundation is worse than Sudan’s. It wasn’t that Obasanjo was oblivious of the issues.
Being a major actor in Nigeria since independence and coming from the South West, he knew what the vexing matters were. But Obasanjo allowed his ego, massaged by budding oligarchs like Tony Elumelu, Cecelia Ibru, Aliko Dangote, Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke, Femi Otedola, Jim Ovia, Festus Odimegwu, Bernard Longe, Fola Adeola, and others, to blind him.
Obasanjo inherited a country that was like a vast piece of land with active gully erosion sites. His primary job was to stabilise the estate by channeling floodwater away from inhabited zones. In his messianic illusion, Obasanjo chose to use his 200 million shares in the mega-corporation, the Transnational Corporation of Nigeria (Transcorp), to transform Nigeria into a nation of skyscrapers and white elephant projects.
As his second term in office was ending, he was fully aware that he had failed. It made him seek a third term in office secretly with the help of his cohorts in the public and private sectors.* *When that mission failed, he decided to handpick a successor that would have no chance of overshadowing him.
*That was how Nigeria got President Umaru Yar’Adua as Obasanjo’s successor. And it was down the hill from there.
Yar’Adua begot Jonathan and Jonathan begot Buhari. And in each of these births, Olusegun Obasanjo was the midwife. If Obasanjo had done the right thing between 1999-2007, it wouldn’t have mattered much who came after him. Nigeria would not have been overtaken by erosion as it is today. Now houses, roads and farms are inside the gullies, and some swept away beyond the country’s shores.
Yar’Adua could not have saved Nigeria because he was not predisposed to tackle such weighty fundamental issues. Unluckily for him, ill-health sealed his fate by wiping out any chance that he could come to a new awareness.
Jonathan assumed power, totally lacking the skill sets needed to surgically extract Nigeria’s cancer cells that were fast metastasizing. Jonathan would spend five years leaving observers with no doubt that Nigeria’s problem outmatched his abilities. Jonathan’s ultimate failure set the stage for the far-reaching compromises that brought Buhari in.
Buhari did not just fail like others before him. He took it a notch up — he lost Nigeria. And that is Nigeria’s greatest tragedy.
Buhari lost Nigeria because he suffered from a bigger messianic complex than Obasanjo. His self-righteous indignation blinded him to the most obvious remedies capable of extending the life of Nigeria. Buhari’s allergy to diversity meant that he had only a narrow tunnel view of the country. It ultimately led him to the current end where the tunnel is collapsing in his face, burying him and the nation in its wake.
In ‘Why Obasanjo Failed,’ I wrote:
“Granted, Obasanjo inherited a fractured country that had been ravaged by years of military misrule. It was a country with so many structural flaws that cracks were visible along its walls, beams, and pillars. There was no sense of direction and no purpose for the nation and its citizens. The country lacked the institutions to support any democratic initiative. The Nigeria Obasanjo was handed over was a country on its stomach.”
“The recipe for failure was put in place when such a country was handed over to someone who had no knowledge and not enough courage to do things that were needed to be done to jump-start the failed nation. Obasanjo was like a partially blind, partially deaf, unskilled driver without any knowledge of the mechanics of machines, who was charged with the responsibility to drive a troubled car in rough weather from point A to point B. It did not take two years before it became clear to serious observers that the man was the wrong choice for that mission.”
If Obasanjo was the wrong person in 1999, Buhari was the ‘wrongest’ person in 2015. But in each case, the doctrine of desperation steeped deep into the fear of losing the country threw Obasanjo and Buhari up as the easiest of all viable options. For a country like Nigeria that loves the path of easy resistance, Obasanjo in 1999 and Buhari in 2015 became the default candidates.
In “Why Obasanjo failed,” I noted the following:
“Obasanjo’s job is not to give billions of naira to certified crooks for the maintenance of the refineries, only to spend more billions importing fuel to avoid the shortage we saw during Abacha’s time. His duty is not to spend billions of naira in Tony Anenih’s road contracts without having roads that lead to a brighter future. Obasanjo’s responsibility is not to scold us for expecting a lot and abuse us for being impatient; rather his task is to provide hope. Unfortunately, Obasanjo could not get over himself. He allowed his exaggerated sense of importance to prevent him from achieving a victory for the Nigerian-kind.
“The litany of crises we are witnessing is the product of the intentional decision by Obasanjo and his cohorts in the ruling PDP to ignore the fundamentals. Basically, they made a deliberate decision to continue from where the NPN of the early 80s stopped, as if all that transpired in the late 80s and all of the 90s were of no consequence. In a more sophisticated way, Obasanjo and his friends embarked on a mission to plunder what remained of Nigeria’s wealth, wellbeing, and welfare.”
The Buhari team has essentially followed the same path. They have plundered Nigeria just like all the successive governments before them.
“Any other PDP candidate of 1999 who fought to lead Nigeria might have spared the nation Obasanjo’s truckload of embarrassments, arrogance, pettiness, vindictiveness, and blatant ignorance, but working within the principles of PDP and with the certified criminals who fill its ranks and file would have also ended up a failure. As long as the fundamental problems of Nigeria, like the very nature of the union, resource control, judicial reform, relationship between the state and the federation, etc, are either ignored or shied away from, all efforts at reform, especially the half-hearted ones, would amount to nothing…
“The primary reason why Obasanjo has failed is his stubborn refusal to implement a deep-rooted structural reform of Nigeria. Obasanjo, full of himself and trusting in his military drill-sergeant mentality, thought he could order around a wounded country. Obasanjo’s resort to patching the wall, managing one crisis after another instead of tearing down the walls and rebuilding a nation has become his waterloo. His choice of actions, or inactions, is the style of cowards and men without vision.”
When it became obvious in 2004 that Obasanjo had failed, this was what we did.
“Interestingly, we have counted out Obasanjo and have plunged into a vigorous search for another personality on whom we shall hang our hope. We are once again refusing to insist on reforms that would guarantee progress irrespective of who occupies Aso Rocks. For some reason, we continue to have the hope that those unprincipled men and women in the National Assembly have in them the right mantle needed to chart a decent course for us. In our stupidity, we are once again betting our survival on some proven crooks, expired characters, and loudmouthed egoists. We are propping ourselves to be satisfied in the realization that any of them would be better than Obasanjo. Just like we once convinced ourselves that, come what may, Obasanjo would be better than Sani Abacha.”
We are already doing this again. We are looking up to the National Assembly to amend the constitution to take their mouth off Nigeria’s breast where they feed fat. We are looking up to the likes of Bola Tinubu, Nasir el-Rufai, David Umahi, Yemi Osinbajo, Atiku Abubakar, Peter Obi, Kayode Fayemi, Yahaya Bello, Orji Uzo Kalu, etc, to save us from the rut they created – the same rut that they still depend on for their sustenance. We are again sure that any of them would be better than Buhari. If that is not a form of mental illness on our part, then I do not know what is.
*The truth is that, unlike in 2015, something has fundamentally changed in Nigeria. Buhari did not just fail spectacularly, he also lost Nigeria in the process.
Nobody on the Nigerian stage today can save it. None. What will save Nigeria is no longer deep reforms, restructuring, repentance, and reconciliation.
Unfortunately, the window for that kind of intervention is closing up fast, if not closed entirely. Secrets that were once hidden are now revealed; irate giants that were once asleep are now awake; and barrels of blood that were shed on the altar of Nigeria for decades are now choking the life out of the country. It is no more Obasanjo’s or Buhari’s grandfather’s Nigeria. The hornets will sting those who disturbed their nest. No amount of prayers will stop it. Nigeria is beaten up, pushed down the hill, and the country is grudgingly marching down to Golgotha. Nobody can carry its cross. The only path out of this valley of death is via reincarnation.
In our own eyes, Buhari dragged Nigeria across the Rubicon. And as Julius Caesar said, “alea iacta est”— the die is cast. Not even Obasanjo can say that Nigeria still dey Kampe.
- Rudolf Ogoo Okonkwo is a Nigerian-American journalist and writer. He is the host of the satirical show, “Dr. Damages Show” on SaharaTV online. Dr. Damages has been featured in the New York Times, BBC and Guardian of London. Okonkwo also writes a weekly column, “Correct Me If I’m Right,” for Saharareporters.com.
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Books
‘My Life of Duty and Allegiance’ —An Elder Statesman’s Version of the Truth
Published
1 day agoon
November 8, 2026
- Book Title: My Life of Duty and Allegiance
- Author: Yakubu Gowon
- Publishers: Continuity Books.
- Reviewer: Dr Emeaba O. Emeaba
- Pages: 881
When a military ruler who presided over a nation’s most catastrophic civil war waits until his tenth decade to publish his memoirs, the reader expects either a profound exercise in grand self-justification or an unburdening of the conscience. In My Life of Duty and Allegiance, General Yakubu Gowon—who assumed power in Nigeria in 1966 at the astonishingly raw age of 31—attempts to give us both. What emerges across 881 densely packed pages is a deeply complex, often moving, yet fundamentally contradictory document: the work of an elder statesman striving to polish his historical legacy, even as his own words repeatedly fracture the varnish.

Gowon’s narrative arc follows a classic post-independence path. Raised in Daura and Wusasa by Christian missionary parents, he traces his early life with an endearing warmth, detailing his rapid ascent through Sandhurst and the Royal Military Academy into the elite officer corps of a newly independent Nigeria. But the heart of the volume, inevitably, is the thirty-month Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), born of the widespread anti-Igbo pogroms that drove a traumatized populace back to the Eastern Region, where secession was declared not out of mere political ambition, but as a desperate, last-stand effort to protect a people facing systemic annihilation—and the turbulent decade of military rule that surrounded it.
To his credit, Gowon writes with an understated dignity that sets his work apart from the bombastic memoirs typical of West Africa’s mid-century military junta leaders. He paints himself not as a tyrant, but as a reluctant servant of statehood—a devout Christian officer forced by tragedy and duty to hold a fracturing federation together at all costs. His reflections on the post-war reconciliation era, anchored by his famous post-conflict decree of “No victor, no vanquished,” radiate a genuine desire to present himself as a noble unifier.
Yet, for all its graceful prose and pious framing, the memoir’s historical value lies less in what it succeeds in proving than in where it visibly falters under critical scrutiny. For historians and careful readers alike, My Life of Duty and Allegiance contains profound textual and factual fractures—moments where the author’s defensive manoeuvring unwittingly conflicts with established records and even his own narrative logic.
Consider Gowon’s account of the chaotic July 29, 1966 counter-coup that brought him to power. Seeking to distance himself from the brutal assassination of his predecessor, General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gowon writes of an impulsive attempt to save the Supreme Commander by phoning the Ikeja airport to order a rescue helicopter under “Major Paul Dickson.” It is a dramatic, noble story—except that military archives establish there was no officer by that name in the armed forces; the only Paul Dickson present was an Air Force staff sergeant tasked with sentry duty. More damaging still is the author’s silence regarding documented transcripts from that very afternoon, in which he authorized the arrest of Ironsi by rebellious officers, famously pausing before asking, “Can you do it?”
This habit of offering personal alibis in place of historical accountability recurs at key junctures. Addressing the collapse of the crucial January 1967 Aburi Accord in Ghana—the peace agreement that represented the last diplomatic exit ramp before full-scale war—Gowon attributes his acquiescence to a “shivering fever,” claiming he was too ill upon returning to Lagos to make sound decisions. Yet audio recordings of the conference reveal a lucid, composed negotiator. The subsequent dismantling of the accord via Decree No. 8 was not the by-product of malaria, but a calculated political retreat orchestrated under heavy pressure from senior federal bureaucrats and military advisers who feared a loss of centralized revenue and power.
Perhaps most unsettling is the book’s arithmetic of tragedy. In describing the devastating human toll of the civil war—where federal blockades and famine devastated the civilian population—Gowon routinely reduces the casualties to “thousands who perished.” To reduce a conflict in which an estimated one to two million Biafran non-combatants died of starvation and military action to a mere “thousand” is not simply an exercise in semantic gobbledygook; it is an attempt to rewrite the scale of a national catastrophe.
When the text turns to post-war governance, the contradictions deepen. Gowon presents his fiscal policies and the post-war “Three Rs” (Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Reconciliation) as gestures of generous magnanimity. Yet he glosses over the brutal reality of the federal policy that awarded a flat sum of just £20 to returning Easterners regardless of their prior bank balances, alongside the controversial Abandoned Properties Act. To reconcile such economic penalization with the high-minded rhetoric of “No victor, no vanquished” requires a degree of cognitive dissonance that the memoir simply cannot sustain.
Similarly, Gowon defends his 1974 decision to indefinitely postpone the transition to civilian rule—a betrayal of his own promises that directly prompted his overthrow in 1975—by citing the political unreadiness of the nation. It is the classic, self-serving paradox of the military autocrat: claiming the nation is too fragile for democracy after nearly a decade of absolute military control without constructing the very institutions necessary to support it.
The performative nature of the memoir’s publication was further underscored at its public launch in Abuja, where General Theophilus Danjuma—the key officer behind the July 1966 operation against Ironsi that vaulted Gowon to supreme power—served as the event’s primary benefactor, donating a staggering ₦3 billion to the project. For critics, the spectacle was less an act of literary patronage than a symbolic closing of ranks among the war’s chief beneficiaries. That a former career officer whose vast post-military fortune stems not from industrial enterprise, manufacturing, or commercial risk, but from lucrative state-awarded discretionary oil concessions, could single-handedly underwrite the celebration of the regime’s official story speaks volumes. It highlights a troubling continuation of the “spoils of war”—a political economy where the wealth and historical narrative of the state remain firmly concentrated in the hands of the very men who reshaped it by force.
My Life of Duty and Allegiance remains an indispensable primary source. It offers an intimate, highly readable window into the mind of a leader who stood at the absolute epicentre of modern Africa’s most traumatic conflict. But readers seeking a candid historical accounting will be disappointed. General Gowon has given us an evidence of faith, duty, and deliberate selective memory. In trying so painstakingly to defend his record, the aging commander has inadvertently provided the very evidence that destabilizes his official history.
_________
♦ Dr. Emeaba, the author of “A Dictionary of Literature,” writes dime novels in the style of the Onitsha Market Literature sub-genre.
Anthony Obi Ogbo
Can Nigerian Voters Replicate America’s Midterm Electoral Revolt?
Published
1 day agoon
November 8, 2026
“Nigeria does not merely need a voters’ revolt. It needs an electoral revolution.” —Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo
Over the past few days, I have been reflecting on America’s historic midterm elections and reading various analyses of the remarkable voter revolt against the political establishment. American voters demonstrated their willingness to punish political failure at the ballot box. But can Nigerians similarly defeat entrenched power when the very institutions entrusted with protecting their votes remain vulnerable to political interference?

America’s November 3 midterm elections delivered a devastating political verdict. Voters, frustrated by rising living costs, the Iran war, and growing dissatisfaction with President Donald Trump’s leadership, handed Democrats control of both chambers of Congress. Republican strongholds fell, political loyalties shifted, and voters demonstrated that incumbency is no insurance against public anger.
The message was unmistakable: when governance fails, the electorate can withdraw its mandate. But across Nigeria, the American revolt has inspired a provocative question: Can Nigerians replicate this electoral uprising in the 2027 presidential election?
The comparison is compelling, but the institutional realities are profoundly different.
Nigeria has no shortage of reasons for electoral rebellion. Economic hardship, persistent inflation, unemployment, deteriorating purchasing power, insecurity, and widespread distrust of government have created a deeply frustrated population. From kidnapping and rural banditry to failing infrastructure and declining public confidence, the country’s governance challenges demand serious political accountability.
Yet frustration alone does not remove a government. Elections do. And therein lies Nigeria’s democratic predicament.
In the United States, elections are administered through decentralized state and local institutions operating under federal and state laws. Election officials, courts, observers, and established legal procedures provide multiple layers of accountability. The system is imperfect, frequently litigated, and vulnerable to partisan disputes. Nevertheless, its decentralized structure makes nationwide electoral manipulation by a single executive authority considerably more difficult.
Nigeria operates differently. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is constitutionally established as an independent institution. However, its chairman and national commissioners are appointed by the president, subject to Senate confirmation. This arrangement creates legitimate concerns about institutional autonomy, particularly when the appointing authority belongs to a political party contesting the elections.
Nigeria’s electoral history reinforces these concerns. The controversial 2007 presidential election exposed serious weaknesses in electoral administration. In 2015, however, Nigerians demonstrated that incumbency could be defeated when Goodluck Jonathan lost to Muhammadu Buhari. That historic transition remains powerful evidence that peaceful electoral change is possible.
But the 2023 presidential election again exposed institutional distrust. Disputes over electronic result transmission, transparency, and electoral procedures eventually reached the Supreme Court, which upheld President Bola Tinubu’s victory.
Courts are constitutionally empowered to resolve election disputes. The problem is not judicial involvement itself, but the perception that electoral outcomes increasingly depend on litigation rather than the unquestioned credibility of votes cast.
When citizens begin to believe that ballots are merely preliminary documents awaiting judicial interpretation, democracy suffers a dangerous credibility crisis.
Equally troubling is the protection of votes. INEC administers federal elections, while the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies provide electoral security. These institutions operate within a centralized federal framework, raising concerns about executive influence over personnel, deployment, and operational independence.
How, then, can Nigerians stage an American-style electoral revolt when the institutions protecting their votes are themselves subjects of public suspicion? The answer requires more than opposition slogans, social media outrage, or massive political rallies.
First, Nigeria must constitutionally reform INEC’s appointment process. An independent, multipartisan selection mechanism, transparent public hearings, protected tenure, and guaranteed funding would reduce executive influence and strengthen electoral credibility.
Second, judicial independence must become nonnegotiable. Transparent appointments, financial autonomy, enforceable ethical standards, and expedited election petitions are essential. Courts must remain impartial arbiters, not become perceived substitutes for the electorate.
Third, electronic transmission and public verification of polling-unit results must become legally enforceable safeguards, supported by independent audits and meaningful penalties for manipulation.
Fourth, election security must be operationally insulated from partisan directives. Electoral offenses, including intimidation, ballot destruction, and result falsification, must attract swift and credible prosecution.
Voters must organize beyond ethnic loyalty
Finally, voters must organize beyond ethnic loyalty, religious sentiment, and online activism. They must register, mobilize, monitor polling units, document irregularities, and protect their electoral mandate through lawful civic participation. The ultimate tragedy of Nigerian democracy is not that citizens lack the courage to reject failed leadership. It is that they cannot consistently trust the machinery entrusted with translating their rejection into political change.
America’s midterms demonstrated the power of electoral accountability. Nigeria’s 2027 elections must confront a more fundamental question: whether the ballot remains stronger than the political establishment.
A democracy becomes a dangerous deception when citizens are permitted to vote but cannot confidently determine who wins. Nigeria does not merely need a voters’ revolt. It needs an electoral revolution in which institutions become stronger than incumbents, ballots become stronger than political influence, and the people’s verdict becomes stronger than the machinery of power.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
Education
Professor Josephine Onyido Earns Prestigious Nigerian Academy of Education Induction
Published
1 month agoon
September 26, 2026By
Anthony Ogbo
University of Port Harcourt scholar will be inducted into Nigeria’s apex education academy in Abuja, marking another milestone in a career spanning teaching, research, leadership, mentorship and advocacy
HOUSTON, TEXAS — Professor Josephine Azuka Onyido, an accomplished scholar and academic leader at the University of Port Harcourt, will be inducted into the Nigerian Academy of Education on Wednesday, November 4, 2026, in recognition of her contributions to the advancement of education.
The ceremony, scheduled for the Conference Hall of the National Commission for Colleges of Education in Abuja, places Onyido among scholars recognized for sustained contributions to education, research, and academic development in Nigeria.
A Professor in the Department of Educational Foundations at the University of Port Harcourt, Onyido has built a career encompassing teaching, research, administration, mentorship, curriculum development, and institutional service.
She described the forthcoming recognition as both an honor and a renewed obligation to education. “I receive this recognition with profound gratitude and humility. My journey in education has always been driven by the belief that scholarship must extend beyond the classroom and contribute meaningfully to society. This induction is not simply a personal achievement; it strengthens my responsibility to continue advancing quality education, mentoring future scholars, and promoting opportunities for women and girls. I am deeply grateful to my family, colleagues, students, and everyone who has been part of this journey.”
Onyido earned a Bachelor of Arts in Education (English), a Master of Education, and a Ph.D. in Sociology of Education. She is also a permanent member of the University of Port Harcourt Senate. Her scholarly record includes more than 90 journal articles, book chapters and Sociology of Education Made Easy, a textbook developed to make concepts in the discipline more accessible to students.
Much of her research examines the intersection of education and society, with particular emphasis on gender, women’s empowerment, educational development, social justice and the rights of women and girls. Her work advocates translating academic research into policies and practices that expand educational opportunities and strengthen human-capital development.
Beyond research, Onyido has occupied several academic leadership positions. She served as Acting Head of the Department of Educational Foundations from 2021 to 2023 and has worked as the Departmental Coordinator of Postgraduate Programs, the Anti-Plagiarism Coordinator, the Academic Adviser, and the Editor of the Port Harcourt Journal of Education Studies.
Her influence also extends beyond her university. She has served as an external examiner for several institutions and has participated as a resource person for the National Teachers’ Institute, the University of Port Harcourt, the Centers for Higher Education and Sandwich Programs, and the National Universities Commission verification exercise.
Internationally, Onyido represented the Niger Delta Development Commission at the African Women in Leadership Conference in Kigali, Rwanda, expanding her engagement with issues of women’s leadership, empowerment, and social transformation.
She belongs to several professional organizations, including the Teachers Registration Council of Nigeria, the Association of Sociologists of Education of Nigeria, and the International Association for Gender Equity.
Her academic and community work have earned numerous recognitions, including the Millennium Development Ambassador Award, Lecturer of the Year, Outstanding Project Supervisor, and Professional Service awards.
Yet Onyido’s story also reaches deeply into heritage and service. She is the great-great-granddaughter of King Josiah Constance Ockiya, MINGI VII, Amanyanabo of Nembe Kingdom and Supreme King of Brass. Her great-grandfather, Rev. Daniel Ockiya, translated the Bible into the Nembe language.
A committed Catholic and Jerusalem pilgrim, she has also served in church and community leadership positions and was recognized by the Catholic Women Organization of the Port Harcourt Diocese as a “Quintessential Woman.”
For Onyido, the November 4 induction represents more than another distinction on an extensive academic résumé. It recognizes a career built around an enduring principle: education achieves its greatest value when knowledge is transformed into opportunity, service, and social progress.
‘My Life of Duty and Allegiance’ —An Elder Statesman’s Version of the Truth
Can Nigerian Voters Replicate America’s Midterm Electoral Revolt?
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Corruption at the Nigerian Consulate Atlanta – A Victim’s Nightmarish Experience
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