Anthony Obi Ogbo
The Biafran Genocide – The Hell I Went Through as a Child
Yet, here I am still standing, pledging allegiance to NIGERIA with all sense of patriotism—a nation still being governed by some of the leaders that masterminded the devastating genocide I survived 53 years ago.
Evacuating a large family from the village, Achala, to remote farmland called Eziobibi, almost twenty miles away on foot, and through near inaccessible road-paths, and under severe weather conditions was not a joke. I was seven at the time, and I walked with a loaded bag unaided. Bomb booms and some crackling sounds of artilleries rattled my nerves as they loomed from afar. This was a flight for life and concessions for being a kid were off the table.
My immediate younger sister was five and was on her feet too. I was not carrying a time clock, but a journey set out in the wee hours through the sunset would have exceeded twelve hours. We made it on foot, and for the records – I was seven, and my sister was five.
Ever since the death of Ikemba Odumegwu Ojukwu who led this war, the print, electronic and social media have been agog with analysis and historical compositions about this leader, and his unfulfilled dreams of Biafran nationhood. With commentaries controlled by emotions and different socio-political interests, it becomes difficult at times to comprehend the physical and psychological realities of three-year bloody combat that decimated the people of Eastern Nigeria, their culture, and their prospects as a region.
Nonetheless, the most compelling opinion remains an eyewitness account of the individuals who fought in the region called Biafra
Psychologically speaking, it is obvious that different experiences underscore different analyses. For instance, those Nigerians who lived during this war and never experienced it speak from Google and Wikipedia. Those who remained overseas while the Igbo people in Eastern Nigeria underwent a genocide would speak from Timelife documentaries, and those who saw, or fought the war in Biafra would speak with emotions or anger.
Nonetheless, the most compelling opinion remains an eyewitness account of the individuals who fought in the region called Biafra; those victims who survived the refugee camps, who thrived in the forest region of various villages for thirty months under thunderous sounds of shelling booms, and rapid-fire of Russian-made raffles.
Yes, I was a child victim of the Biafran civil war, and my testimony came from memory rather than Google. As a 6-year old before the war and a 9-year old after, who also survived the post-war era, it is sometimes difficult to sit on the same panel of discussion with peers who lived normal lives in the same period in the war-free Nigerian territory. They would make you feel guilty or look at you as some unpatriotic nincompoop – a Biafran loyalist that is. Sometimes they argue from the rear in a sheer fallacy or even recite doctored Internet information or adulterated opinions retrieved from nowhere.
Without reaching any search tools, I can speak from the memory of this horrible past that I saw it all with my naked eyes. I was in Kindergarten when the initial war campaign started, and Coal City was under bombardment by fighter and bomber jets operated by White mercenaries. Trenches were dug in the schools to provide safe areas against fighter plane attacks. The teachers would always remove our white shirts, and throw us into these trenches anytime the bomb alerts went off. This was the initial stage.
As a child during that war, I witnessed dead bodies, wounded soldiers, hungry and sick refugees eager to eat just about anything. In Achala, Awka province, where I survived the war, refugees trooped in thousands, and relief workers fed them with cornmeal. A bowl a day could do for a person, and when supplies ran out, refugees walked around the town for anything chewable. I saw refugees feed on lizards, insects, rats, and just about anything that could ease a devastating need for survival. I also saw sick ones who got so sick out of malnutrition or other strange diseases. This was the time I knew about Kwashiorkor – severe energy malnutrition typified by insufficient protein consumption. It was a sorry sight to see my fellow kids crawling with protruded bellies, and emaciated body frames visibly revealing their ribs.
As a child, I stood awake with others, sleepless at nights for fear of unexpected bombardment. I knew what assault rifles looked like; saw how bombers descended from nowhere and dropped bombs at market places. Yes, I can recall the day we were playing kite in grand dad’s gigantic compound and two bomber planes descended from nowhere and flew over. The noise alone could till a rocky ground – then as these flying equipment vanished into a cloudy sky, a shocking sound trailed. Moments later we learned that a busy Otuocha Market was bombed, and bodies were crushed like roaches – eloquent of the fact that the Nigerian troops targeted civilians. This was just a tip out of a devastating 30-month horrific experience as a child who did not go to the war field but suffered it all.
Kids went to school barefooted, while others stayed home because their parents could not afford tuition, books, and uniforms.
Yet the worst was yet to come after the war in 1970. We were hauled back to a city we left three years back. A city now devastated by the war was left without basic amenities. School buildings, churches, and homes were torn apart by shelling and other destructive devices of the war. I attended school under the trees at times and classes shifted at intervals to secure a comfortable shadowed spot. Pupils brought their desks to school because there was just none at the time.
Kids went to school barefooted, while others stayed home because their parents could not afford tuition, books, and uniforms.
Now, this was the war I saw and survived. Yet it is more distressing to have gone through this ordeal as a child without a single post-war traumatic therapy. I could just close my eyes and think of what it is like for a young child to be in traumatic situations. He can feel helpless and passive. He could have the most difficulty with their intensely physical and emotional reactions; he could just lose out in the process of coping with ongoing threats to his survival; he could not afford to trust, relax or fully explore his feelings, ideas, or interests.
Yet, here I am still standing, pledging allegiance to NIGERIA with all sense of patriotism—a nation still being governed by some of the leaders that masterminded the devastating genocide I survived almost 50 years ago.
Young trauma victims often come to believe there is something inherently wrong with them; that they are at fault, unlovable, hateful, helpless, and unworthy of protection and love. Such feelings lead to poor self-image, self-abandonment, and self-destructiveness. Ultimately, these feelings could leave them vulnerable to subsequent trauma.
Yet, here I am still standing, pledging allegiance to NIGERIA with all sense of patriotism—a nation still being governed by some of the leaders that masterminded the devastating genocide I survived almost 53 years ago.
Now, for those who do not understand what this means to an average IGBO man, and who would sit down and utter insensitive analysis about the realities of this war without consideration of the unnoticed ravages of its outcome; I will say bring it on and I will eat you raw!
♦ Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D. is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. Article included Excerpts from my documentary, Biafran War – What I Saw With My Naked Eyes (2011). Initially published in the West African Pilot, May 30, 2020 >>>
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths—Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo
More than five decades after the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970, former Head of State Yakubu Gowon has finally offered his own detailed account of the conflict that permanently reshaped Nigeria. Gowon, who became Nigeria’s leader in 1966 after the counter-coup that followed the assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, presided over the most tragic chapter in the nation’s history—the Biafran War that claimed millions of lives, many of them civilians. Ironically, the same military establishment that elevated him during the crisis later removed him from power in 1975 while he attended an OAU summit in Uganda.
His long-awaited memoir has reopened old wounds and revived unresolved questions about the war, the collapse of the Aburi Accord, and the decades-long collective silence that followed the conflict. The biggest question, however, is this: why now?
Why did Gowon wait more than fifty years after the war to tell his side of the story, especially when nearly all the principal actors are gone? Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu published multiple accounts and speeches in defense of Biafra and in criticism of the federal government’s handling of the crisis. Former military leaders and participants also documented their perspectives over the years. Yet Gowon remained largely silent, rarely challenging many of the dominant narratives surrounding the war and the Aburi negotiations.
Now, at a time when history itself has become a battleground, his memoir appears less like a contribution to reconciliation and more like an attempt to reclaim control of a contested national memory.
One of the most controversial areas remains the Aburi Accord of January 1967, held in Ghana to prevent the collapse of Nigeria. The accord was meant to restructure Nigeria into a looser federation and restore trust between the regions. Historical accounts have long suggested that disagreements over interpretation and implementation led to its collapse. Critics argue that Gowon’s government later diluted key provisions through Decree No. 8, effectively undermining the spirit of the agreement.
Many historians maintain that Gowon, then a relatively inexperienced military ruler, lacked the constitutional depth and political sophistication required to fully grasp the implications of the accord and the forces surrounding him. Whether that criticism was entirely fair or not, the result was catastrophic: the failure of Aburi paved the way for war.
Yet even more troubling about his memoir are the omissions.
Any honest account of the Nigerian Civil War must begin with the massacres of Igbo civilians in Northern Nigeria in 1966. Those killings created fear, mistrust, and mass displacement that ultimately pushed the Eastern Region toward secession. For many Igbo families, the war did not begin with Biafra’s declaration; it began with bloodshed in the North and the inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government to stop it.
Gowon’s narrative blatantly pays insufficient attention to these foundational events, thereby presenting the war in isolation from the atrocities that triggered it. To discuss the war without fully confronting those killings risks presenting an incomplete and morally imbalanced history.
That is why this memoir is generating discomfort in many quarters, particularly among the Igbo. Nigeria is presently witnessing renewed efforts by younger generations to build broader coalitions across ethnic and regional lines. Many Igbo political actors are attempting to move beyond the bitterness of the civil war era and reposition themselves within a more inclusive national conversation ahead of future elections. Against that backdrop, Gowon’s memoir arrives at a deeply sensitive moment.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances.
Rather than healing old divisions, the book risks reviving distrust and reopening unresolved grievances. To many observers, it feels less like reflection and more like historical revisionism – an attempt to sanitize controversial decisions, soften accountability, and redefine public memory before history reaches its final verdict.
No nation survives by suppressing uncomfortable truths. Nigeria cannot genuinely move forward until it confronts the civil war with honesty, balance, and courage. Gowon had every right to tell his story. But timing matters, omissions matter, and history demands more than selective remembrance.
The Nigerian Civil War was not merely a military conflict. It was a human tragedy built on political failure, ethnic violence, broken agreements, and mutual distrust. Any account that minimizes those realities will always struggle for moral credibility, no matter how many years pass.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
“Nigeria reframed terrorism, corrected Washington’s lens, and secured cooperation —a pure anatomy of diplomatic turnaround“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
Nigeria’s recent engagement of a United States–based lobbying firm under a reported $9 million contract was widely scrutinized, predictably misunderstood by some, and quietly effective. The objective was clear: to shape Washington’s understanding of Nigeria’s complex security challenges—particularly violence affecting Christian communities—within an accurate geopolitical, intelligence, and regional framework. Such engagements are not unusual. In fact, they are a routine and essential feature of modern international diplomacy, allowing governments to clarify policy positions, counter distorted narratives, and ensure that domestic security crises are not flattened into simplistic talking points for foreign consumption.
In an era where global perception can influence aid, sanctions, military cooperation, and diplomatic goodwill, strategic communication has become inseparable from national security. Nigeria’s decision to professionally engage Washington signaled an understanding that security today is fought not only on the battlefield but also in briefing rooms, policy memos, and diplomatic corridors.
Evidence suggests that this recalibration has begun to yield results. Just days ago, former U.S. President Donald Trump publicly acknowledged—belatedly—that Muslims are equally among the primary victims of ISIS terrorism. It was a striking rhetorical shift for a political figure who had long leaned on broad, inflammatory framing that blurred the distinction between extremist violence and religious identity. That admission did not emerge in a vacuum. It followed sustained pressure from global security analysts, regional experts, and Muslim leaders who have repeatedly challenged the false narrative that terrorism is rooted in faith rather than criminal ideology, geopolitical instability, and organized violence.
More importantly, the acknowledgment coincided with tangible policy movement. Trump-aligned U.S. security networks have quietly expanded counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration. This development underscores a pragmatic recognition that effective counterterrorism is not achieved through threats, isolation, or performative rhetoric, but through partnership, intelligence sharing, and regional capacity building.
This week, the United States delivered fresh military supplies to Nigeria to support ongoing security operations. The delivery followed recent U.S. air strikes against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) targets, carried out at Nigeria’s formal request. While air strikes often attract public attention, the more consequential story lies beneath the surface: a shift toward coordinated intelligence operations, logistical support, and sustained military collaboration. This is not symbolic diplomacy. It is functional, operational alignment.
Contrast this moment with an earlier chapter in Nigeria–U.S. relations. During the Jonathan administration, Nigeria experienced significant difficulties in its diplomatic engagement with Washington. Rather than relying on seasoned foreign policy professionals, security strategists, and international communications experts, the government leaned heavily on local intermediaries and political loyalists to interpret and convey Nigeria’s position abroad. The result was a weakened diplomatic posture, fragmented messaging, and persistent misinterpretation of Nigeria’s internal security realities. Critical issues—ranging from Boko Haram’s evolution to regional insurgency dynamics—were often viewed through incomplete or distorted lenses.
That experience offered a lasting lesson: goodwill alone does not translate into influence. In global politics, perception must be managed as deliberately as policy. Strategic silence, amateur diplomacy, or reactive communication leaves a vacuum—one that is quickly filled by external narratives, advocacy groups, or political opportunists with their own agendas.
What has changed now is not merely tone, but method. Nigeria’s current approach reflects an understanding that diplomacy is not capitulation, and lobbying is not a sign of weakness. It is leverage. It is preparation. It is the disciplined articulation of national interest in a language that global power centers understand. By engaging professionally, Nigeria reframed its security narrative—not as a sectarian failure, but as a shared counterterrorism challenge that requires international coordination.
Even Donald Trump’s posture illustrates this transformation. A leader who once relied on threats, ultimatums, and rhetorical spectacle has now, through institutional channels, become part of a support framework working with regional actors to strengthen security and civilian protection. The shift is not ideological; it is a strategic move. And it reflects the enduring truth that diplomacy often succeeds where bluster fails.
In international politics, power is not only measured by firepower or economic weight, but by the ability to persuade, align, and sustain cooperation. Nigeria’s recent experience is a reminder that nations are not judged solely by their crises, but by how effectively they explain, manage, and confront them on the global stage. Diplomacy, when practiced with clarity and professionalism, does not dilute sovereignty—it reinforces it.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us
Anthony Obi Ogbo
When Air Power Becomes a Christmas Performance: The Illusion of Success in Trump’s Nigerian Strike
“Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise.“ —Anthony Obi Ogbo
When President Trump announced his authorized United States air strike against ISIL (ISIS) fighters in northwest Nigeria on Christmas Day, there was an immediate burst of celebration on Nigerian social media. For a country exhausted by years of kidnappings, massacres, and territorial insecurity, the announcement sounded like long-awaited international support. Memes circulated, praise poured in, and some Nigerians hailed Trump as a decisive global sheriff finally willing to act where others hesitated.
But after the initial euphoria settled, a sobering assessment emerged: the strike appeared less like a strategic military intervention and more like a made-for-television spectacle designed to burnish Trump’s international strongman image.
This was not the first time the United States has launched air strikes in Africa or the Sahel under the banner of counterterrorism. From Libya to Somalia, from Syria to Yemen, U.S. “precision strikes” have often been announced with confidence and celebrated with press briefings—only for the targeted groups to regroup, mutate, and, in some cases, expand their reach. In Nigeria itself, years of foreign-backed security assistance have failed to decisively neutralize Boko Haram or its ISIS-affiliated offshoots. Instead, violence has fragmented, spread, and grown more complex.
No verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated
The Nigerian strike followed a familiar pattern. U.S. officials framed it as a blow against ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP), a group aligned with the global ISIS network. Trump’s language suggested a decisive intervention—an act of muscular diplomacy signaling that America still projects power where it chooses. Yet no verifiable evidence has been produced to confirm high-value ISIS targets were eliminated, leadership structures dismantled, or operational capacity degraded.
What followed was a digital smokescreen. Social media accounts, many anonymous and unverified, began circulating gruesome images of dead bodies and destroyed villages—photos long associated with banditry in Nigeria’s northwest. These images were quickly repurposed to “prove” the success of Trump’s strike. However, this is where the narrative falls apart under scrutiny.
Trump’s mission, as publicly stated, was to target ISIS. Not bandits. Not kidnappers. Not rural criminal gangs. ISIS is a transnational terrorist organization with ideological, financial, and operational links across continents. Bandits, by contrast, are primarily armed criminal groups—motivated by ransom, cattle theft, and territorial control, not global jihad. Conflating the two may be politically convenient, but it is analytically dishonest.
Killing or displacing bandits does not equate to dismantling ISIS. In fact, indiscriminate or poorly targeted air strikes often worsen the situation, pushing criminal groups to radicalize, splinter, or align with extremist factions for protection and legitimacy. This pattern has been observed repeatedly in conflict zones where military force substitutes for intelligence-driven strategy.
A truly successful counterterrorism raid is not measured by dramatic announcements or viral images. It is measured by clear, verifiable outcomes, including the confirmed elimination of high-ranking commanders, disruption of recruitment and financing networks, seizure of weapons caches, and—most importantly—sustained reductions in civilian attacks. None of these benchmarks has been credibly demonstrated in the aftermath of Trump’s Nigerian air strike.
Instead, Nigeria wakes up to the same grim reality: villages remain vulnerable, highways unsafe, and communities terrorized. The strike did not change the security equation. It did not empower Nigerian forces. It did not restore civilian confidence. And it certainly did not neutralize ISIS as a strategic threat.
This air strike offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
In that sense, the air strike was not merely ineffective—it was a failure dressed in the language of strength, executed for optics, and amplified for political gain. It offered Nigerians symbolism, not security.
If the goal is truly to eliminate ISIS and its affiliates in West Africa, the path is neither theatrical nor unilateral. It requires robust intelligence sharing, sustained training, and real-time coordination with Nigerian and regional forces. It demands targeted arms assistance, logistical support, and investments in surveillance capabilities that allow local militaries to act decisively and lawfully. Above all, it requires a long-term commitment to strengthening state capacity—not fleeting air shows announced from afar.
Bombs alone do not defeat ideology. Precision without intelligence is noise. And celebration without results is self-deception. Trump’s Nigerian air strike may have produced headlines, but history will remember it for what it was: a failed mission masquerading as success.
♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015) and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us