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Why The West African Oil Boom Ended So Abruptly

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4 years ago

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Global oil production is slowly recovering towards pre-Covid-19 levels, but in West Africa the pandemic is set to leave lasting effects. This important region for sweet crude oil production faces numerous challenges as it strives to heal from the pandemic, including underinvestment, a lack of infill drilling at mature fields, and infrastructure that is either aging or threatened, a Rystad Energy analysis showed.

Sweet crude is the preferred oil grade to make jet fuel – the worst-hit segment as oil demand plunged last year. West African crude oil production dropped to 3.71 million barrels per day (bpd) last year from 4.12 million bpd in 2019, and is set to decline further to 3.39 million bpd this year. While we expect output to tick back up in 2022 and 2023 as jet fuel demand returns, production is set to fall below 3 million bpd already from 2025 unless heavyweights Nigeria and Angola can stage a strong comeback and shake off the dismal growth trends of the past decade.

West Africa’s oil production was not destined to follow this current grim projection before Covid-19 hit – in fact, the region was in line for more investment and activity. Last year’s low oil prices and the unstable market conditions that have continued into 2021 changed the outlook, however, as major operators decided to practice capital discipline and limit their investment exposure in regions including West Africa.

As a result, Rystad Energy has reduced its forecast for West African crude oil output by 600,000 bpd for 2021 and by 650,000 bpd for 2026, compared with our pre-Covid-19 projections.

“The structural upstream obstacles that West Africa faces are realities that are not going away in the short term. Even if jet fuel makes a spectacular recovery and demand for light and medium sweet crude grades returns, Nigeria and Angola, as well as other neighbors in structural upstream decline, will not be in a position to supply the market,” says Nishant Bhushan, upstream analyst at Rystad Energy.

The region’s decline in 2021 is driven by its two biggest oil producers, Nigeria and Angola, which together are estimated to have lost 440,000 bpd versus the pre-Covid-19 forecast. We also estimate that crude oil production has dropped significantly in countries such as Congo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, which together produced between 250,000 bpd and 300,000 bpd in 2010. Equatorial Guinea has seen a 60% reduction in oil production and Gabon nearly 35% in the past 11 years.

Crude oil production from West African countries was expected to pick up pace in tandem with their Middle Eastern counterparts as the OPEC+ group opened its supply taps. But even as OPEC+ production caps have gradually eased, Nigeria and Angola have not been able to ramp back up to their pre-shut-in production levels.

Crude production is not the only thing that’s been hit in the past couple of years. Since the start of 2020, we have also seen that the overall crude production capacity in Nigeria and Angola has taken a major blow. This is due to a number of reasons, including rapid declines at mature fields due to a lack of infill drilling, postponement of final investment decisions that were originally planned for 2020 and 2021, a lack of investment in oil and pipeline infrastructure which leads to frequent production shut-ins (prevalent in Nigeria), and civil unrest caused by militia groups.

West Africa has never had much unused capacity – most countries have produced at maximum capacity even as that capacity was gradually declining. When OPEC+ unveiled its massive 9.8 million bpd cut program in May 2020, the region had an overall oil production capacity of 4.2 million bpd. We estimate this has dropped by almost 420,000 bpd to around 3.8 million bpd by the end of 2021, and will keep shrinking to 3.5-3.6 million bpd by the end of next year.

Nigeria

Nigeria produces sweet crude grades ranging from light to heavy, but most of the volumes fall into medium to light grades. We expect the output of all sweet crude grades in Nigeria will decrease on the back of declining production from mature fields. The major drop in crude oil production is in grades like Bonga, Egina, and Qua IBoe, which are estimated to fall collectively by 180,000 bpd to 200,000 bpd by 2026 from 2021. Other crude grades, like Forcados, Bonny Light, Escravos, and Erha, are estimated to remain little changed, while some growth will be seen in crude grades like Amenam, Brass River, and Jonas Creek.

The decline in Nigeria’s crude oil production in recent years looks more structural as the country has failed to attract new investments in its oil and gas industry, be it in exploration, greenfield developments, or brownfield expansions. In the short term, we estimate Nigeria’s crude oil production will rise to about 1.55 million bpd in 2022 and 1.58 million bpd in 2023, with some new marginal field developments adding 30,000-35,000 bpd in 2022 and another 35,000-40,000 bpd in 2023. At the same time, some fields currently in the ramp-up phase are estimated to add 65,000-70,000 bpd in 2022, but only 10,000-15,000 bpd in 2023. After 2023, we estimate Nigeria’s output will continue to slide due to a lack of significant new discoveries, slipping to as low as 1.25 million bpd by 2026.

Angola

Like Nigeria, Angola’s decline in crude oil production is also structural, and production has been plummeting since 2015 – from 1.74 million bpd in 2015 to almost 1.11 million bpd in 2021. This output slump is the direct result of a lack of new investments in exploration and a failure by operators to halt the production decline at mature oil fields. New upstream projects are estimated to add 40,000-45,000 bpd this year and another 80,000-90,000 bpd in 2022, but this will not be enough to halt the downward spiral that will reduce Angola’s crude oil production to between 750,000 bpd and 800,000 bpd by 2026.

Angola mostly produces sweet crude, and we expect production of all the major sweet crude grades to slide in the coming years. We see overall sweet to regular crude grade output slumping by almost 300,000 bpd from 2021 to 2026 – a drop of about 30%. Major crude grades such as Nemba, Dalia, Mostarda, Gindungo, Girassol, and Kissanje are estimated to cumulatively decline by 280,000-300,000 bpd in 2026 from 2021. Some smaller crude grades like Sangos, Saturno, Cabinda, and Plutonio are estimated to remain at similar levels or inch up by 15,000-20,000 bpd combined.

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Africa

U.S. Signals More Strikes in Nigeria as Abuja Confirms Joint Military Campaign

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2 weeks ago

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December 27, 2025

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The United States has warned that further airstrikes against Islamic State targets in north-western Nigeria are imminent, as Nigerian officials confirmed that recent attacks were part of coordinated operations between both countries.

The warning came hours after U.S. forces struck militant camps in Sokoto State, an operation President Donald Trump publicly framed as a response to what he described as the killing of Christians in Nigeria. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the strikes were only the beginning.

“The president was clear last month: the killing of innocent Christians in Nigeria (and elsewhere) must end,” Hegseth wrote on X. “The Pentagon is always ready, so ISIS found out tonight—on Christmas. More to come. Grateful for Nigerian government support & cooperation.”

Nigeria’s foreign minister, Yusuf Tuggar, confirmed on Friday that the strikes were carried out as part of “joint ongoing operations,” pushing back against earlier tensions sparked by Trump’s public criticism of Nigeria’s handling of insecurity.

The airstrikes followed a brief diplomatic rift after Trump accused Nigeria’s government of failing to protect Christians from militant violence. Nigerian officials responded by reiterating that extremist groups in the country target both Christians and Muslims, and that the conflict is driven by insurgency and criminality rather than religious persecution.

Speaking to Channels Television, Tuggar said Nigeria provided intelligence support for the strikes in Sokoto and described close coordination with Washington. He said he spoke with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio for nearly 20 minutes before briefing President Bola Tinubu and receiving approval to proceed, followed by another call with Rubio to finalize arrangements.

“We have been working closely with the Americans,” Tuggar said. “This is what we’ve always been hoping for—to work together to combat terrorism and stop the deaths of innocent Nigerians. It’s a collaborative effort.”

U.S. Africa Command later confirmed that the strikes were conducted in coordination with Nigerian authorities. An earlier statement, later removed, had suggested the operation was carried out at Nigeria’s request.

Trump, speaking in an interview with Politico, said the operation had originally been scheduled for Wednesday but was delayed at his instruction. “They were going to do it earlier,” he said. “And I said, ‘Nope, let’s give a Christmas present.’ They didn’t think that was coming, but we hit them hard. Every camp got decimated.”

Neither the U.S. nor Nigerian authorities have disclosed casualty figures or confirmed whether militants were killed. Tuggar, when asked whether additional strikes were planned, said only: “You can call it a new phase of an old conflict. For us, this is ongoing.”

Nigeria is officially a secular state, with a population split roughly between Muslims and Christians. While violence against Christian communities has drawn increasing attention from religious conservatives in the United States, Nigeria’s government maintains that extremist groups operate without regard to faith, attacking civilians across religious lines.

Trump’s public rhetoric contrasts with his 2024 campaign messaging, in which he cast himself as a “candidate of peace” who would pull the United States out of what he called endless foreign wars. Yet his second term has already seen expanded U.S. military action abroad, including strikes in Yemen, Iran, and Syria, as well as a significant military buildup in the Caribbean directed at Venezuela.

On the ground in Sokoto State, residents of Jabo village—near one of the strike sites—reported panic and confusion as missiles hit nearby areas. Local residents said no casualties had been recorded, but security forces quickly sealed off the area.

“As it approached our area, the heat became intense,” Abubakar Sani told the Associated Press. “The government should take appropriate measures to protect us. We have never experienced anything like this before.”

Another resident, farmer Sanusi Madabo, said the night sky glowed red for hours. “It was almost like daytime,” he said. “We only learned later that it was a U.S. airstrike.”

For now, both Washington and Abuja are projecting unity. Whether the strikes mark a sustained shift in strategy—or another brief escalation in a long war—remains unclear.

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Nigeria–Burkina Faso Rift: Military Power, Mistrust, and a Region Out of Balance

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4 weeks ago

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December 14, 2025

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The brief detention of a Nigerian Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and its crew in Burkina Faso may have ended quietly, but it exposed a deeper rift shaped by mistrust, insecurity, and uneven military power in West Africa. What was officially a technical emergency landing quickly became a diplomatic and security flashpoint, reflecting not hostility between equals, but anxiety between unequally matched states navigating very different political realities.

On December 8, 2025, the Nigerian Air Force transport aircraft made an unscheduled landing in Bobo-Dioulasso while en route to Portugal. Nigerian authorities described the stop as a precautionary response to a technical fault—standard procedure under international aviation and military safety protocols. Burkina Faso acknowledged the emergency landing but emphasized that the aircraft had violated its airspace, prompting the temporary detention of 11 Nigerian personnel while investigations and repairs were conducted. Within days, the crew and aircraft were released, underscoring a professional, if tense, resolution.

Yet the symbolism mattered. In a Sahel region gripped by coups, insurgencies, and fragile legitimacy, airspace is not merely technical—it is political. Burkina Faso’s reaction reflected a state on edge, hyper-vigilant about sovereignty amid persistent internal threats. Nigeria’s response, measured and restrained, reflected confidence rooted in capacity.

The military imbalance between the two countries is stark. Nigeria fields one of Africa’s most formidable armed forces, with a tri-service structure that includes a large, well-equipped air force, a dominant regional navy, and a sizable army capable of sustained operations. The Nigerian Air Force operates fighter jets such as the JF-17 and F-7Ni, as well as A-29 Super Tucanos for counterinsurgency operations, heavy transport aircraft like the C-130, and an extensive helicopter fleet. This force is designed not only for internal security but for regional power projection and multinational operations.

Burkina Faso’s military, by contrast, is compact and narrowly focused. Its air arm relies on a limited number of light attack aircraft, including Super Tucanos, and a small helicopter fleet primarily dedicated to internal counterinsurgency. There is no navy, no strategic airlift capacity comparable to Nigeria’s, and limited logistical depth. The Burkinabè military is stretched thin, fighting multiple insurgent groups while also managing the political consequences of repeated military takeovers.

This imbalance shapes behavior. Nigeria’s military posture is institutional, outward-looking, and anchored in regional frameworks such as ECOWAS. Burkina Faso’s posture is defensive, reactive, and inward-facing. Where Nigeria seeks stability through deterrence and cooperation, Burkina Faso seeks survival amid constant internal pressure. That difference explains why a technical landing could be perceived as a “serious security breach” rather than a routine aviation incident.

The incident also illuminates why Burkina Faso continues to struggle to regain political balance. Repeated coups have eroded civilian institutions, fractured command structures, and blurred the line between governance and militarization. The armed forces are not just security actors; they are political stakeholders. This creates a cycle where insecurity justifies military rule, and military rule deepens insecurity by weakening democratic legitimacy and regional trust.

Nigeria, despite its own security challenges, has managed to avoid this spiral. Civilian control of the military remains intact, democratic transitions—however imperfect—continue, and its armed forces operate within a clearer constitutional framework. This stability enhances Nigeria’s regional credibility and amplifies its military superiority beyond hardware alone.

The C-130 episode did not escalate into confrontation precisely because of this asymmetry. Burkina Faso could assert sovereignty, but not sustain defiance. Nigeria could have asserted its capability, but chose restraint. In the end, professionalism prevailed.

Still, the rift lingers. It is not about one aircraft or one landing, but about two countries moving in different strategic directions. Nigeria stands as a regional anchor with superior military power and institutional depth. Burkina Faso remains a state searching for equilibrium—politically fragile, militarily constrained, and acutely sensitive to every perceived threat from the skies above.

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NBA pick Khaman Maluach Hoping to ‘Change the Narrative’ About Africa

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7 months ago

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June 27, 2025

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Immediately after getting drafted, Maluach was asked: “So many people, when they think about Africa, think about strife, think about war, think about not so great things about the continent, let alone South Sudan. How much of a responsibility do you think you have in changing perceptions of what people think Africa is in terms of thinking more about the resources, thinking about the people of Africa and South Sudan, specifically?”

Maluach’s native country, South Sudan, is undergoing a humanitarian crisis. His family fled the country to a suburb of Kampala, Uganda, in search of safety and opportunity during the South Sudan crisis. He now hopes to change the narrative about the region by highlighting its good parts on the world stage.

“I think about showing them the good parts of Africa,” Maluach said at the press conference after he was drafted. “I’m thinking about showing them the great places in Africa, like Kigali, whether it’s Senegal, whether it’s the safaris in Africa, and showing them the cultures we have and the people we have, which is different from the stuff they see on TV. I just want to change the narrative, the narrative of our people and how they see my continent.”

Maluach was born in Rumbek, once an important city in South Sudan that was ravaged by the country’s civil war. The 7’2″ center’s road to success was far from easy. The nearest basketball court to his house was nearly an hour’s walk away and usually packed. Moreover, he played his first game in Crocs, not basketball shoes. But his dedication was enough to catch the eye of local coaches Wal Deng and Aketch Garang.

Through the effort that he put in, Maluach made it to the NBA Academy Africa in Saly, Senegal, then to the Duke Blue Devils, and now the Suns. He hopes the moment inspires kids on the continent.

“Living in Africa, I had the whole continent on my back. Giving hope to young kids,” he said after the Suns selected him No. 10 overall.

Maluach considers basketball a gift God gave him, and hopes to finish off his NBA career as a Hall of Famer.

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