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How Nigerian Government Gave Indicted Cocaine Trafficker Multi-million Dollar Supply Contract

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The investigation, which was done by Nigerian journalist, David Hundeyin and reported by West Africa Weekly, delves into how the rot in the system led to an embarrassing scarcity of passports for Nigerians at home and abroad.

This report exposes the rot, racketeering, ethnic nepotism, complete failure of due diligence, and how an indicted cocaine trafficker has come to control the supply of passports to Nigerian citizens.

The investigation, which was done by Nigerian journalist, David Hundeyin and reported by West Africa Weekly, delves into how the rot in the system led to an embarrassing scarcity of passports for Nigerians at home and abroad.

“We acknowledge and apologise for the challenges faced in the past few weeks regarding passport booklets availability. I am glad to inform you that booklets are now available and are being distributed to all our passport issuing centres.”

With these words on March 31, former Comptroller-General of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) Babandede verbally signed a cheque that the NIS would subsequently fail to cash. Through the course of his tenure as CG, Nigerians had become used to chronic passport booklet shortage and the associated black market arbitrage, but the shortage had become acute by 2021. He needed to make a statement to reaffirm his competence.

Speaking at the commissioning of the Maitama Passport Express Centre – itself a master class in formalised black market arbitrage – Babandede made that statement, and then some. A special team would be dispatched to “facilitate enrollment and production” of passports across Nigeria and its foreign missions. New passport offices to service air passengers would be sited at the airports in Lagos, Kano and Abuja. The new “premium passport processing centre” in Abuja would cut the length of passport issuance and renewal from several weeks to just 72 hours.

Ultimately, Babandede’s statement turned out to be just that – a statement.

From when he made these pronouncements until his retirement earlier this month, passport booklets continued to be a scarce and expensive commodity in Nigeria. Several factors were blamed for the baffling inability of Africa’s most populous country to provide passports for its citizens. Chronic corruption at the NIS; disputes between the NIS and a private contractor responsible for printing booklets; scarcity of forex to pay for security printing materials; even an alleged unofficial government policy to stem brain drain by making passports hard to access – all these have variously been blamed for this state of affairs.

As is so often the case in Nigeria, no theory or explanation should be dismissed out of hand, which is why when I set out to find out what is really behind the perennial shortage of these little green booklets, I was prepared for anything. Or at least I thought I was. What would emerge as I sank my teeth into this however, was not a story about supply chain disruptions or government inefficiencies. It was nothing like I had ever seen before, which is saying something.

Think Transformers meets Black Mirror meets Karishika, with protagonists who are part Elon Musk, part Lawrence Anini and part Bakin Zuwo. There is a murder in New York; a million dollar cocaine deal in Bogotá. Court cases in New Jersey; a legitimate high tech manufacturing operation in Kuala Lumpur; art exhibitions in Lagos; high society marriages; prominent placement in lifestyle and celebrity magazines, and the most comically brazen lawbreaking hidden in plain sight. If this story were a movie, it would be the conceptual offspring of Michael Bay and Ugezu J. Ugezu, which is to say, low on plot and purpose, but high on sheer crash-bang value.

There are 3 main characters in this story. Their existence and relevance was determined after speaking to 5 different sources within the NIS ecosystem. These 3, more than any other people, have had the most influence on passport issuance and the wider state of the Immigration Service. Unsurprisingly, the first name on the list is immediate past CG Muhammad

None of my sources have any especially nice words to say about him, but neither do they have any bitter personal complaints either. The impression that comes through about Babandede is that of a fundamentally limited man who is neither virtuous nor especially malevolent. As one of the sources puts it frankly:

“He tried to make some moves such as the passport express centres, but it didn’t work out because he was just there to make money before he retired. He didn’t really care about fixing any systemic issues like staff motivation or the ISTL contract. All that one was not his business.”

The sources inform me that under Babandede’s tenure, complete opacity was institutionalised, with Immigration officers now not even knowing how much to expect on their payslip at the end of the month. Apparently during his tenure, NIS staff were migrated to the Integrated Payroll and Personnel information system (IPPIS), and with that went any sort of transparency regarding staff pay scales, deductions and entitlements. As a source colourfully puts it during one of our long conversations:

“It has now got to the point that you don’t know what will come in at the end of the month, and whatever it is that comes in – you just have to take it like that. The deductions vary every month so we don’t know how much we will take home. So tell me as a man with people depending on you, how else will you survive if not through ‘egunje’ (bribes)?”

While the sources mention different things that Babandede could have done to protect NIS staff welfare and morale, they all have one consistent criticism of him – his alleged ethnocentric posting policy. During his tenure they say, desirable NIS postings such as NIS offices in Lagos, were given exclusively to northerners, while the southerners working there were all posted out. The Ikoyi immigration office I am told, is now staffed almost exclusively by northerners – a state of affairs that would be impossible if the roles were reversed.

Under Babandede and even in these early days of his successor Idris Jere, the sources say, many northerners in the NIS, encouraged by the prebendalist disposition of their superiors, are keen to let everyone know that it is “their turn” and they are in power. Following Idris Jere’s appointment a source claims, the next most senior Deputy Comptroller – a southerner from Lagos – who might have been next in line to succeed Jere, was promptly transferred to Sokoto. At press time, I have been unable to independently verify this.

The other name that every source mentions is a certain “Liman” at the Ikoyi Passport Office. None of the sources bothers to hide how they feel about this fellow. This man and his extreme racketeering they say, is one of the major reasons behind Nigeria’s passport shortage. A bit of research brings up his name as Abdullahi I. Liman, a Deputy Comptroller in charge of the Ikoyi Passport Command of the NIS.

Every single source has a terrible story to tell about Abdullahi Liman. Liman they say, is responsible for the northernisation of the Ikoyi Passport Command. Even worse one source tells me, under Liman’s tenure, the atmosphere at the Command has taken on explicitly polarised ethnic and religious overtones. Take this anecdote from one of the sources for example:

“You can imagine that you are in the middle of doing a capture, then all of a sudden your colleague who is also capturing will just stand up and leave his station with a crowd of people there – because he says he is going to pray. You now end up doing his work for him, can you imagine that? This did not happen before Liman came in.”

Liman they say, is in the habit of pointedly using Hausa to converse with his subordinates at work, which automatically puts every southerner working under his command at a real career disadvantage. Speaking English – or in fact any other language but Hausa – at work is now a career demerit at the Ikoyi Passport Command under Liman’s watch.

A few days after I speak to this source, this story by the Foundation for Investigative Journalism was published, detailing persecution of a southern NIS officer at the Ikoyi Command in the exact ways described by my sources. Notice the reporter’s description of his interaction with Liman.

Up to this point, I have relied on testimony from sources I consider trustworthy, but even their knowledge of affairs at the NIS has its limits. While people like Abdullahi Liman are running rackets within the NIS to restrict access to passport booklets in large population centres like Lagos so as to create a lucrative black market, the sources are also clear that they believe that the NIS simply does not have enough passport booklets. To truly understand why the NIS appears to have not just a distribution problem, but also a supply problem with passport booklets, I had to figure out whose interests were served by the status quo.

First, a brief primer on how Nigeria’s passport system works.

Starting in 2003, Nigeria adopted the e-passport standard to defeat counterfeiting, resulting in a contract awarded to IRIS Smart Technologies Limited (ISTL) which commenced in 2007. The scope of the contract was to implement the Nigeria Harmonised ECOWAS Electronic (SMART) Passport Autogate Systems as well as to supply e-passport booklets, wafers, laminates and maintenance services from 2006 and 2015. ISTL is affiliated with Malaysia’s Iris Corp, which carries out the actual security printing services including supply of e-passport booklets.

The services that ISTL renders to the NIS include creating and maintaining the electronic database containing the passport details of Nigerian citizens, as well as maintaining the communication infrastructure that keeps a constant uplink between passport registration offices and the ISTL data centre. In case the reader has not seen the problem with this, allow me to spell it out clearly:

A private company working for a profit incentive has full and unrestricted access to the sensitive data of all Nigerian passport holders, but more importantly, it alone has access to this data. In other words, ISTL has more access to passport holders’ data than the NIS itself. ISTL does not actually produce passport booklets, but sub-contracts production to the Malaysian firm Iris Corp. Essentially, this company that most people have never heard of, controls a valuable sovereign database exclusively, and all it has to do is maintain a few dozen closed VSAT links from passport registration centres. Essentially, tech support.

This in fact caused a row between the NIS and the company in 2017 when the 10-year contract came up for renewal. Speaking to Daily Trust in 2017, some NIS insiders claimed the following: That the initial contract was a threat to national security because it vests control of the Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) – an official government seal – in ISTL, instead of the Nigerian government, which on paper is a risk factor for fraud;

That its implementation did not follow due process;

That the database and other infrastructure was paid for by the Nigerian government, but ISTL holds on to government property and uses tactics such as refusing to train NIS officers in the management of the system as a way to strong-arm the government into renewing its contract;

That NIS officers cannot conduct basic maintenance and repairs on the ISTL systems, meaning that the Nigerian government cannot withdraw from the ISTL contract without incurring catastrophic costs, which violates public procurement regulations;

That the contract had questionable exclusion clauses that gave undue advantage to ISTL at the expense of the Nigerian taxpayer.

The Malaysian company subcontracted by ISTL to print the booklets meanwhile, has found itself facing corruption probes by Malaysian authorities over its activities in other African e-passport jurisdictions such as Guinea. So putting this picture together, we have a tech support company that has somehow wrangled its way into a $138 million 10-year government contract (which was eventually renewed in 2019). Its main activity is maintaining equipment and an electronic database, and it sub-contracts passport booklet printing to a company halfway around the world whose executives have been arrested on corruption charges.

For the purpose of balance, it must be pointed out that the $138 million figure is not paid by the government, but rather comes from the company’s revenue generation activities within the scope of the e-passport project. It is also important to point out that the criticisms of the ISTL contract were possibly made in bad faith by individuals who merely wanted to replace ISTL with their own companies. Indeed, the senior NIS official quoted by the Daily Trust in 2017 remarked, “[The controversy] is between contractors who want the contract. The NIS’ concern is simply the supply of the booklets.”

It is also important to mention that the cost of sub-contracting Iris Corp to print the booklets is paid is USD, while ISTL’s revenue comes in naira, with the CBN refusing to provide forex for the company. This I am reliably informed, is the material reason behind the chronic booklet shortages since 2017 – the cost of printing passport booklets has more than doubled in dollar terms since 2015. Hence, ISTL simply cannot afford to print as many booklets as before.

With that being said, we now know that there is an incredibly lucky or powerful entity behind ISTL. Who is this person? This is where the story really takes a few turns, so hold on to your hats.

High Society Gentleman or Ex-Cocaine Trafficker?

On its website, ISTL describes itself as a “major subsidiary of the flagship company, Image Technologies Limited (Imagetech).” A quick CAC database check on Imagetech brings up the elusive character behind the curtain.

For a Lagos socialite, Olayinka Fisher is a man who somehow keeps a decidedly low profile. For one thing, while researching this story, establishing what exactly his name is turns out to be quite the task. In some places, he is “Yinka Fisher.” In some other places, he is “Olayinka Fisher.” In still other places, he is “Olayinka Fischer” or “Sonayon Fisher.” Only in a few places that he would rather the world did not know about, does his full and correctly spelled government name appear: “Olayinka Sonayon Fisher.” So who is this guy and what is there to him?

Quite a bit, as it turns out.

The story starts in Mr. Fisher’s previous iteration as a high flying Nigerian diplomat in in mid-to-late 1970s. At the time, when he was still known to the world as Olayinka Sonayon Fisher, he was the Second Secretary of the Nigerian Mission to the United Nations.

Researching the many variants of his name online, references to his diplomatic career can be seen right up until about 1980 when he seems to vanish off the face of the historical earth. In 1989, he resurfaces on CAC documents in Nigeria as the majority shareholder in a new company called Imagetech. Presumably at this point, the high-achieving diplomat has decided to pivot into a career in tech entrepreneurship. Nigeria being what it is, nobody ever really bothers to ask why, and by 2003 he is signing the contract above for ISTL under President Olusegun Obasanjo.

The good times are rolling. Following the end of his marriage to River State scion Doris Amachree, he weds Dr. Pius Okigbo’s daughter Anne. He becomes an avid art collector and patron of the arts. He hosts art exhibitions with the Spanish Embassy in Lagos, which are co-curated by both of his sons who share his love of the visual arts. To all intents and purposes, he is the SI unit of the classy and respectable old money Lagosian. There’s just one problem:

According to U.S. court records, Mr. Fisher allegedly used to be part of an intercontinental cocaine smuggling ring.

I obtain the following documents from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. They detail court proceedings from a 1983 case involving a violent drug dealer wanted for a murder in the Bronx, New York, a successful American businessman who dabbled into the illegal drug business with him, and a Nigerian diplomat who used his diplomatic immunity to traffic shipments of cocaine into the U.S. on their behalf.

The diplomat’s name? A certain Olayinka Sonayon Fisher.

According to Tracy Wong, the indicted American businessman, he paid Fisher the sum of $50,000 for a single shipment. The indictment further states that this arrangement lasted for at least 2 years with multiple Cocaine trafficking trips made worth several million dollars. Exactly how much Fisher made from this arrangement in total is a question only he can answer, but it certainly raises a few interesting questions.

Perhaps the most telling part of this story is that following the release of this NYT article and his subsequent exit from the diplomatic corps, Fisher appears to have intentionally dropped all mention of “Sonayon” from his name. In fact, it took the extraordinary step of making a few calls to my hometown Badagry, where the name “Sonayon” also originates from, to confirm his identity. The fact that this has somehow slipped under the radar for decades despite his custody of one of the most sensitive databases in Nigeria is a sign of a catastrophic failure of state intelligence and due diligence.

Making this point further, I speak to a lawyer, Solomon Igberaese to give his professional opinion of this issue. He points out that according to the Public Procurement Act 2007, someone with Fisher’s background should have been disqualified from the public procurement process. In his words:

“Falsification of fact can be interpreted to also include drug trafficking. Carrying out drug trafficking under any other guise will constitute falsification of fact. That he concealed packages inside diplomatic pouches certainly qualifies as falsification of fact. Again the section said falsification of facts relating to any matter.”

So there we have it – possibly the most mind-bending story in Nigeria’s rich history of dodgy public procurement and contracting. For added measure, the third person in the drug ring, a career drug dealer called Joseph Anthony Margarite was also wanted in connection with a murder at the time of his involvement with Wong and Fisher.

Culled from the Sahara Reporters  

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From Noise to Votes: Nigerian Youth Must Turn Online Fire into Electoral Power

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Young Nigerians have shown a remarkable ability to create waves in the digital space. With a single click, they can expose a politician’s corruption, rally tens of thousands of supporters behind a single hashtag, and keep every political actor on edge from dawn until dusk. However, as the 2027 general elections draw closer, it is time to face an uncomfortable truth: loud online noise isn’t the same as real power in the political sphere. If Nigerian youth wish to get the best possible leadership from their nation’s leaders, they need to take their online activity offline (i.e., to places where actual democracy occurs) and start showing up to cast votes.

There is simply too much evidence to ignore that this needs to occur. Nigeria is a young country demographically. Together, Gen Z and Millennials comprise approximately half of the total population—50.1 percent—according to IntelPoint. Gen Z makes up 25.8 percent and Millennials account for 24.3 percent. When we consider Gen Alpha, the percentage rises to 85.7% of the population under 44. According to ActionAid Nigeria, more than 60% of Nigeria’s population is under 30. According to Afrobarometer, Nigeria has a median age of 18.1 years, and 58% of its population is aged 0-29. Therefore, Nigeria isn’t merely a young country; it is a country dominated by young people.

Based on this information, this dominant demographic should wield considerable political influence. Unfortunately, there often appears to be little correlation between these statistics and political influence. The contrast is striking. While a majority of Nigeria’s population is young, there remains a significant gap between how influential young people are politically and how influential they could be. This lack of influence is not due to a lack of ability among young people; rather, it stems from many young people stopping short of completing what is often called the “civic journey,” which involves moving from awareness to action. They consume politics, engage in political debate on social media, participate in meme politics, and express frustration with politics through social media rants; however, many young people still fail to register to vote (PVCs) or participate in elections in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome.

This disparity is important because youth dissatisfaction is far from abstract. More than 23% of Nigerian youth report being unemployed or seeking employment, according to Afrobarometer. Additionally, more than two-thirds of youth aged 18 to 35 report having some form of postsecondary or secondary-level education. Despite Nigeria ranking among the lowest in providing employment and opportunities for youth, and despite identifying high costs of living, unemployment, crime and security concerns, poverty, poor economic management practices, and insufficient access to electricity as the top five issues requiring immediate attention from government officials, youth dissatisfaction cannot be considered indifferent. Rather, youth dissatisfaction reflects citizens’ grievances and legitimate reasons to be deeply interested in who governs their country.

However, mere interest alone will not suffice. Democracy does not reward passion without participation. A young person can identify every weakness inherent in a political system; however, unless that person participates by casting a vote, they will remain a spectator to their own future. If you are mature enough to understand concepts such as inflation, insecurity, broken campaign promises, unemployment rates, and poorly managed governance systems, you are mature enough to accept responsibility for your role in creating solutions to those problems. That responsibility begins with voting.

In addition to continuing to use social media to raise awareness of voter registration, election knowledge, fact-checking mechanisms used during elections, and peaceful participation methods, social media can also serve as a vehicle for facilitating the transition from social media activism to actual civic engagement. Young Nigerians should leverage their social media presence to encourage voter registration, promote election literacy programs, provide fact-checking services to counter election misinformation, and advocate for nonviolent participation throughout the electoral cycle. They should convert their social media timelines into civic classrooms. Where can I find the information I need about voter registration processes? Where is my assigned polling station located? Where do I receive my Permanent Voter Card? How do I protect myself from spreading misinformation? How do I properly monitor election results? These are not dull topics; they represent essential tools required for surviving democracy.

Youth organizations, creators, and social media entities can also help facilitate offline civic engagement. Use your WhatsApp groups to alert others as registration deadlines approach. Use X Spaces and Instagram Live to focus on discussing relevant issues rather than hurling insults. Use TikTok to simplify the voting process. Use Facebook to motivate family members and first-time voters to participate in elections. Use whatever platforms are available to make civic obligation contagious. Nigeria’s youth have shown they can create viral content. Now they must begin to generate participation on a viral scale.

One of the most damaging myths in Nigerian politics is that “your vote doesn’t matter.” It is a self-fulfilling prophecy that only serves the interests of cynics, crooks, and machines whose success depends solely on low turnout. Yes, Nigeria’s electoral process has flaws. Yes, there have been numerous disappointments. However, the response to a flawed democracy is not abandonment; it is increased participation. By staying home on Election Day, youth essentially give their votes — and therefore control — directly to the very same groups they loathe.

Another mythological excuse for the youth’s failure to vote in Nigeria is the claim that “all politicians are alike.” No — they’re not all the same. While some politicians are inept, others are corrupt, and others exhibit both characteristics, democracy is not about seeking holy men or women; it is about making selections and enforcing accountability. An individual who refuses to make a selection for office because none of the options appear acceptable is ultimately selecting the candidate most likely to emerge victorious by default.

Nigeria’s youth already constitute the country’s largest demographic group. It is time for them to become its strongest democratic force as well. However, that will not be achieved by trending hashtags alone. Instead, it will be achieved when online energy is harnessed and directed toward political organization, civic education, voter registration, increasing voter turnout, and holding elected representatives accountable after elections.

The 2023 election saw remarkable youth participation but lacked follow-up. Therefore, the 2027 election should not produce another generation of disillusioned observers; instead, it should yield a new generation of participatory citizens. Let online flames ignite electoral power. Let debates become ballots. Let criticism evolve into participation. If Nigerian youth can dominate social media, they can also dominate democracy. The future will not be handed to them in a retweet. They must elect it into existence.

_________

♦ Chris Ulasi is on the Editorial Board of The West African Pilot News. He contributes stories about culture and tradition, elite politics, ethnicity and national integration, civil society, and social movement. He is a university professor, community builder, poet, film producer, recording the emergent Nollywood cultural history through film.

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Between Silence and Sabotage: Jonathan’s Return to Political Manipulation

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“Jonathan’s calculated and weaponized ambiguity breeds deception and weakens emerging political alliances.” —Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo

Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has once again found himself at the center of presidential speculation, floating silently above the country’s political waters while supporters aggressively market him as a possible candidate ahead of another critical election cycle. And once again, Jonathan is doing what he has mastered throughout his political career: saying nothing clearly while allowing political confusion to grow around him.

This pattern is not new. It is the same indecisive political behavior that defined some of the most consequential moments of his rise and fall. Jonathan became president in 2010 following the death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. At the time, many northern political stakeholders within the then-ruling PDP believed there was an informal understanding that Jonathan would complete Yar’Adua’s term but not seek another full term in 2011, thereby preserving the party’s zoning arrangement between North and South. Instead of taking a clear and immediate position, Jonathan spent months dribbling the nation politically. He neither fully denied nor openly confirmed his intentions until the political tension had already escalated nationwide.

By the time he eventually declared his candidacy, the damage had been done. Many northern allies who initially supported him felt betrayed, politically cornered, or deceived. The PDP fractured internally, regional distrust deepened, and Jonathan’s relationship with major northern power blocs deteriorated permanently. Though he won the 2011 election, the cracks created by that indecision followed him into 2015, contributing significantly to the coalition that eventually removed him from power.

Yet Jonathan learned little from that experience. Since losing reelection in 2015, his name has repeatedly surfaced during every major electoral cycle as a potential presidential contender. Each time, his supporters strategically floated his candidacy across media platforms and political circles. Each time, Jonathan refused to decisively shut the door. Silence became his political instrument, whereas ambiguity became his strategy.

Now the country is witnessing the same playbook again. As coalition politics intensify and opposition forces attempt to consolidate around alternative political movements, Jonathan’s name has resurfaced aggressively. Reports and speculations about his presidential ambition continue to dominate political discussions, especially within camps seeking to disrupt the growing momentum surrounding Peter Obi and emerging opposition realignments.

The troubling part is not merely that Jonathan’s supporters are campaigning. The troubling part is that Jonathan fully understands the implications of his silence. He knows that his political stature carries enough weight to destabilize fragile coalition negotiations. He knows his name alone can divide campaign structures, weaken consensus-building, and inject uncertainty into opposition calculations. Yet he refuses to publicly and definitively state where he stands.

That is not statesmanship. That is calculated political ambiguity. Jonathan’s political history is filled with similarly contradictory choices. After losing power in 2015, he received widespread praise for conceding defeat peacefully. He initially framed that decision as a sacrifice made to preserve Nigerian lives and prevent violence. Later, however, different narratives emerged suggesting international pressure, particularly from the United States under President Obama. The shifting explanations weakened what could have remained one of his strongest democratic legacies.

Then came another contradiction. Despite emerging politically from the PDP, Jonathan gradually aligned himself closely with the administration of former President Muhammadu Buhari, serving in diplomatic and goodwill capacities that many PDP loyalists considered politically inappropriate. This unusual closeness fueled longstanding allegations that elements within the APC establishment viewed Jonathan as a useful political instrument capable of destabilizing opposition coalitions from within. Whether those allegations are true or not, Jonathan’s conduct has consistently created room for suspicion.

His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible.

Today, his undeclared ambition is already generating confusion among supporters, coalition organizers, and opposition strategists. His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible. His intentions are unclear. Yet his loyalists continue mobilizing aggressively in his name while he watches silently from the shadows.

Nigeria is too politically fragile for this kind of elite gamesmanship. At critical national moments, leadership demands clarity, courage, and accountability. Jonathan cannot continue operating as a permanent “maybe” in Nigeria’s political future, thoughtlessly hovering around every election season like an unanswered question designed to manipulate negotiations and weaken emerging alliances.

At this time, Jonathan should sit in or sit out! If he wants to run, he should declare openly, defend his record, and face the democratic process directly. If he does not intend to run, he should immediately and publicly withdraw his name from the political marketplace. Anything short of that increasingly looks less like political strategy and more like calculated deception. Nigeria deserves leaders who make difficult choices openly—not politicians who weaponize silence while others gamble with national uncertainty in their name.

♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015)  and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us

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The Devastation of Insurgency: Nigeria Cannot Kill Its Way Out of Insecurity

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“Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent” —Dr. Declan Onwudiwe

Nigeria cannot kill its way out of insecurity. While military victories may win battles, only legitimacy, governance, and economic opportunity can secure lasting peace. Across the country, persistent violence, characterized by impunity and a tragic disregard for human life, has exposed the limits of a force-only approach. The time has come for a more sweeping and planned security response.

What is most troubling is the continuing victimization of innocent citizens, especially women and children. Reports of attacks on farmers, worshippers in churches and mosques, and travelers have become disturbingly routine. Kidnappings, sexual violence, and the killing of schoolchildren have weakened public confidence in the state’s ability to protect its people. These are not individual events but symptoms of a deeper structural crisis. Yet, Nigeria is not without options. A strategic and sustained plan can alter this trajectory.

Cooperation between Nigeria’s security forces and international partners is praiseworthy and necessary. However, a recurring weakness undermines these gains: areas cleared by the military are often left insufficiently secured, allowing insurgents and bandits to return. A viable strategy must go beyond clearing territory to consolidating control. Insurgent groups adapt rapidly; after defeat, they disperse, regroup, and re-emerge in areas where governance is weak. Every community reclaimed by force but left without sustained state presence risks becoming tomorrow’s battleground.

Experience from other regions underscores this point. Countries such as Colombia and Iraq that have made substantial progress against insurgency have done so by maintaining a firm and continuous government presence in liberated areas. Where state authority is visible through security, justice, and basic services, insurgents find it much harder to re-establish control. Where it is absent, violence returns. Nigeria must learn from this reality and prioritize holding territory as much as reclaiming it.

At the heart of the problem is a governance deficit. Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent. Recovered areas commonly lack functioning institutions, effective policing, and access to justice. Without these, citizens remain vulnerable, and security gains become temporary. A credible strategy must ensure that communities reclaimed by security forces are immediately supported with police presence, local administration, and basic services, including healthcare, education, and dispute resolution.

Equally important is the recognition that the population, not the battlefield, is the true center of gravity in counterinsurgency. Intelligence from local communities is indispensable, but it depends on trust. Where citizens feel protected and respected, they are more willing to share information. Where they feel neglected or abused, they withdraw. Strengthening this relationship between citizens and the state is essential.

Intelligence-led security operations are far more effective than broad, reactive force. Targeted precision, based on reliable information, disrupts insurgent leadership, logistics, and financing networks. But this requires the population’s cooperation. When criminals operate with impunity, and accountability is weak, citizens lose confidence and hesitate to engage. Restoring trust, therefore, requires both professionalism within the security forces and a justice system that swiftly and fairly punishes wrongdoing.

Beyond security operations, Nigeria must address the economic drivers of instability. Youth unemployment and underemployment remain major concerns. Many young people struggle to find meaningful livelihoods, keeping them vulnerable to exploitation by criminal and extremist networks. Security cannot be sustained without opportunity. Investments in agriculture, education, infrastructure, electricity, and small-scale industry are not just economic policies; they are security measures. A population rich in hope and opportunity is less susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by violent groups.

The question of self-defense has also entered public debate. While communities have a natural right to protect themselves and arm themselves, widespread and unregulated access to weapons carries serious risks. Criminological literature shows that the proliferation of arms without accountability can fuel cycles of violence and create new security challenges. The solution is not to transform communities into rival armed camps but to build structured partnerships between citizens and the state.

Community-based security initiatives can play a valuable role when properly organized, regulated, and integrated into the wider security framework. Groups such as local defense volunteers should operate under unambiguous legal authority, receive appropriate training, and remain accountable to state institutions. When managed effectively, such partnerships can enhance intelligence gathering, strengthen local resilience, and complement formal security forces.

Nigeria now remains at a crossroads. It can continue to approach insecurity primarily as a military problem and remain trapped in a cycle of temporary victories followed by renewed violence. Or it can adopt a more extensive, more strategic approach, one that acknowledges that sustainable security depends on governance, legitimacy, and opportunity as much as on force.

The way forward is clear. Nigeria must hold every liberated area through sustained security and governance. It must prioritize intelligence by building trust with local communities. It must deliver a visible and tangible state presence through schools, healthcare, and justice systems. It must formalize and regulate community-based security initiatives. And it must expand economic opportunities to reduce the appeal of violence and criminality.

Countries that have turned the tide against insurgency did so not through force alone, but by rebuilding the bond between the state and its people. Nigeria must do the same. Until that bond is strengthened, insecurity will remain not just a threat at the margins, but a challenge rooted at the core of the nation’s stability.

Only through a coordinated, long-term strategy can Nigeria move from managing insecurity to truly controlling it.

____

■ Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe, Ph.D., of the School of Public Affairs, Texas Southern University, is a Professor and Director, Africa Institute for Strategic Security Studies (AISSS). He is also on the EDITORIAL BOARD of  the WAP

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