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Despite Huge Reserve: Nigerians Groan As Cooking Gas Price Keeps Soaring

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Firewood and charcoal mongers are now smiling to the banks with the attendant rise in deforestation……

Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or cooking gas is now beyond the reach of average Nigerians as many have turned to charcoal or firewood.

A kilogramme of cooking gas is now N625 or more, depending on the location, forcing many households and eateries, especially in urban centres to seek alternative means of cooking.

Firewood and charcoal mongers are now smiling to the banks with the attendant rise in deforestation.

Experts have warned relevant stakeholders on the consequences of the shortage on the health of residents and the environment at a time global warming is taking a toll on different parts of the world.

Multiple increases in months

Despite a proven estimate of 206.53 trillion standard cubic feet of natural gas deposits in Nigeria as of June 2021, the price of cooking gas has surged higher beyond the reach of Nigerians, with five increases recorded in three months, Daily Trust reports.

Our reporters in a survey on Tuesday observed that the prices of various kilogrammes of LPG have surged more than 50 per cent, with a 12.5kg content selling for N7, 800 or more, rising from N6, 500 in less than a month.

Some of the gas users who spoke to our reporters during the market survey in Lagos, Abuja, Kano, Kaduna and Nasarawa states, among others, said the situation had forced scores of poor Nigerians to resort to using charcoal-fuelled stoves to cook.

Records of gas price tags indicated that the marketers began to hike the product price from April this year, rising from around N3, 600/12.5kg cylinder to N4, 200. By May, gas filling plants sold 12.5kg for N4, 700 while it reached N5, 000 in June and N5, 700 in early July.

It was learnt that those buying in lower volumes like 3kg, 5kg, 8kg and 10kg, paid over 50 per cent more than they did in March.

The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) recently reported that the volume of LPG supplied in August fell by 20.5% to 85,264.803 metric tons (MT) compared to 107,224.584MT supplied in July and 102,787.234MT in June.

This sharp decline, according to dealers, might lead to further upward pressure on the retail prices of the product.

The Executive Secretary of PPPRA, Abdulkadir Saidu, also in a recent statement said of the 85,264MT volume, 38,040.457MT was sourced locally by Ever Oil, Stockgap, NIPCO, 11 Plc., Greenville Natural Gas, PNG Gas Ltd, NPDC and Ashtavinayak Hydrocarbon Ltd. in August.

However, the larger part of 47,224.346MT was imported by NIPCO, Matrix, Algasco, Techno Oil, Prudent, A. A Rano, and Stockgap. The imports were more from the USA; Algeria and Equatorial Guinea in Africa.

Gas price increasing since April – NBS report

Confirming the rise in the gas price is the recent report of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which said that the average price for refilling a 5kg cylinder of cooking gas increased by 0.56 per cent from N2,057.71 in March 2021 to N2,069.21 in April 2021.

As of Tuesday, a 5kg cylinder volume of cooking gas was sold for N3, 250 in Abuja.

According to the NBS latest report, the average price of a 5kg cylinder of cooking gas in August rose by 3.44% from N2,141.59 in July to N2,215.33. The product sold higher in Akwa Ibom at N3, 025.45; Benue at N2, 825.00 and Jigawa at N2, 521.43. The prices were lowest in Abuja at N1, 806.66, Ondo at N1, 840.81 and Lagos at N1, 847.70.

The average price for refilling a 12.5kg cylinder also saw an increase of 2.09% at N4,514.82 in August from N4,422.32 in July 2021 and was more expensive in Abuja (N5,837), Kogi (N5,237) and Ogun (N5,170) but the cheapest in Niger (N4,021), Kebbi (N4,042) and Jigawa (N4,079).

Users groan

Some gas users blamed the federal government for its inability to control the price in the open market.

In many parts of Lagos, one kg of cooking gas sells for N600, which is N7, 500 for 12.5kg cylinder and N3, 560 for 6kg cylinder.

Mrs Vivian Kogi, a resident of Lagos described as worrisome, the rising cost of cooking gas, which she said had made many go back to use of coal and firewood because kerosene was also expensive.

“With the way things are going, the cost of gas may rise to N1, 000 per kilogram by end of the year,” she predicted.

Mrs Kate Okpalefe, who lives in Ketu Ijanikin, said many of her neighbours had resorted to the use of charcoal pots because they could no longer afford gas.

Aina Babatunde, a taxi driver, said he abandoned his gas cooker for a charcoal stove.  “Many of us can’t buy cooking gas anymore; government should do something about it. The price keeps increasing every day.’’

A restaurateur in Abuja, Hajia Muinah Fagbohun, decried the increase, saying her daily revenue had dropped.

“The government should please prevail on gas marketers to bring down the prices of gas,” she said.

Mrs Salamatu Bello, a housewife said she bought a 3kg volume at N2, 750 at a refilling plant, instead of the N2, 200 she paid in August.

“That little gas has increased by N550 yesterday when I bought it at Karu. It is now difficult for us to use gas and the cost of kerosene is not helping matters,” she said.

John Abu said he bought a 12.5kg gas content on Saturday for N7,800 in Nyanya, the highest record in that part of Abuja.

“It has never been so high like this before; I think we have to find a cheaper alternative, which may be the charcoal stove,” he said.

In Kaduna, the price per kilogramme had risen from N320 to N600 within the time under review.

Musa Mando, a bookseller, called for price control, saying cooking gas was now beyond the reach of the masses.

Abba Ibrahim of Hotoro Quarters, in Kano, said he had switched to using the kerosene stove.

“I just can’t afford cooking gas these days…It is N600 per kg as against the N300 or N320, we paid last month.  I have no option but to get a stove,” he said.

Marketers blame forex, VAT

Daily Trust reports that marketers had resorted to various explanations for the hike as they blamed the foreign exchange (forex) crisis.

Some of them said low supply and a rise in Value Added Tax (VAT) on gas import were to blame.

Malam Sagir Bello Baba, a cooking gas seller in the Tarauni area of Kano said they never experienced such a rapid hike in prices of cooking gas before.

“Our business, our source of livelihood is crumbling. Government should do something,” he said.

Aminu Isiaka, a major dealer at Kurnan Asabe, Kano, said the implications are many.

“Many people have been pushed out of business. There is also serious pressure on forests because firewood mongers are raiding forested areas cutting down trees.

“And most importantly, the development is a serious setback to the green initiative of the federal government. People have been sensitised in the last few years to stop felling trees and after resistance, many started using gas but it is now beyond their rich.

“We know there was no subsidy on gas and I wonder where the problem lies,” he said.

Reversal of tax regime fingered

Mr Sylvanus Ogbonna, who sells cooking gas in the Ikeja area of Lagos, attributed the hike in the price of cooking gas to the implementation of a 7.5 per cent tax on imported LPG.

“There is no constant price from the last two weeks… The price is changing because of the nature of our supplies and the VAT increase,” he said.

The Secretary, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Retailers of Nigeria (LIPGAR) in Kano, Alhaji Muhammad Omede, who blamed the forex crisis, said the government should always consider the public when making policies.

A management source with one of the four major importers said: “There are many issues involved. For the imported liquefied natural gas, the price is dominated by the dollar. So the more the naira is devalued, the higher the prices will continue to rise.

“The federal government re-introduced value-added tax (VAT) that was suspended about three years ago in a bid to reduce the price of LPG. The government is looking everywhere for revenue and they were forced to reintroduce VAT.

“But the worst of the government action was that they backdated these VAT to 2020, which has now left the four major importers with huge debt amounting to over N1 billion.”

The source also said due to the backdated VAT, most companies were not importing, as everyone depends on supply by NLNG).

On his part, the Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Association of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Marketers (NALPGAM), Mr Bassey Essien, said Nigeria consumed about one million MT of cooking gas annually and that 65 per cent of this was sourced abroad.

Essien said the CBN had no dedicated window for foreign exchange for cooking gas importers; hence the sourcing of foreign exchange at a high price ultimately dictated the price.

“We, as marketers, are also saying that the NLNG and other gas producers should domesticate the production chain for cooking gas by dedicating sufficient quantity for domestic consumption,” he said.

Commenting on the gas price hike, a Lagos-based petroleum industry analyst, Suraj Oyewale, said the major reason for the gas price hike is due to the foreign exchange devaluation.

“Upstream gas contracts are usually priced in dollar, even for gas supply to the domestic market. But due to the scarcity of foreign exchange in recent years, gas suppliers have accepted payment in naira by the gas processors and other wholesale gas buyers, usually at the official exchange rate.”

NNPC blames low supply, says FG doing its best

The Group Managing Director of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Malam Mele Kyari, has said poor supply of gas was the main challenge.

Kyari stated this recently when he visited the management of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) in Abuja.

“Today, this country is under-supplied with gas. I can tell you that we are having difficulty feeding our network across the country with gas. Every day, it is a trouble to deliver gas. Once your supply is weak, it will affect pricing,” he said.

He, however, said the corporation was working with other sister agencies on a strategy to expand its network of availability, which would subsequently lead to gas directly delivered to homes of end-users.

“If we do this, all cylinders will not be of any use. That is why I don’t see them used in many developed countries. When we can power thermal gas plants across the country and very close to the users, ultimately, homes will be run with electric cookers and utensils and that way, you will have less need for cylinders.

“We are transiting and we will continue to add more volume into the market so that we bring down the prices,” he said.

Culled from the Daily Trust News Nigeria

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From Noise to Votes: Nigerian Youth Must Turn Online Fire into Electoral Power

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Young Nigerians have shown a remarkable ability to create waves in the digital space. With a single click, they can expose a politician’s corruption, rally tens of thousands of supporters behind a single hashtag, and keep every political actor on edge from dawn until dusk. However, as the 2027 general elections draw closer, it is time to face an uncomfortable truth: loud online noise isn’t the same as real power in the political sphere. If Nigerian youth wish to get the best possible leadership from their nation’s leaders, they need to take their online activity offline (i.e., to places where actual democracy occurs) and start showing up to cast votes.

There is simply too much evidence to ignore that this needs to occur. Nigeria is a young country demographically. Together, Gen Z and Millennials comprise approximately half of the total population—50.1 percent—according to IntelPoint. Gen Z makes up 25.8 percent and Millennials account for 24.3 percent. When we consider Gen Alpha, the percentage rises to 85.7% of the population under 44. According to ActionAid Nigeria, more than 60% of Nigeria’s population is under 30. According to Afrobarometer, Nigeria has a median age of 18.1 years, and 58% of its population is aged 0-29. Therefore, Nigeria isn’t merely a young country; it is a country dominated by young people.

Based on this information, this dominant demographic should wield considerable political influence. Unfortunately, there often appears to be little correlation between these statistics and political influence. The contrast is striking. While a majority of Nigeria’s population is young, there remains a significant gap between how influential young people are politically and how influential they could be. This lack of influence is not due to a lack of ability among young people; rather, it stems from many young people stopping short of completing what is often called the “civic journey,” which involves moving from awareness to action. They consume politics, engage in political debate on social media, participate in meme politics, and express frustration with politics through social media rants; however, many young people still fail to register to vote (PVCs) or participate in elections in sufficient numbers to affect the outcome.

This disparity is important because youth dissatisfaction is far from abstract. More than 23% of Nigerian youth report being unemployed or seeking employment, according to Afrobarometer. Additionally, more than two-thirds of youth aged 18 to 35 report having some form of postsecondary or secondary-level education. Despite Nigeria ranking among the lowest in providing employment and opportunities for youth, and despite identifying high costs of living, unemployment, crime and security concerns, poverty, poor economic management practices, and insufficient access to electricity as the top five issues requiring immediate attention from government officials, youth dissatisfaction cannot be considered indifferent. Rather, youth dissatisfaction reflects citizens’ grievances and legitimate reasons to be deeply interested in who governs their country.

However, mere interest alone will not suffice. Democracy does not reward passion without participation. A young person can identify every weakness inherent in a political system; however, unless that person participates by casting a vote, they will remain a spectator to their own future. If you are mature enough to understand concepts such as inflation, insecurity, broken campaign promises, unemployment rates, and poorly managed governance systems, you are mature enough to accept responsibility for your role in creating solutions to those problems. That responsibility begins with voting.

In addition to continuing to use social media to raise awareness of voter registration, election knowledge, fact-checking mechanisms used during elections, and peaceful participation methods, social media can also serve as a vehicle for facilitating the transition from social media activism to actual civic engagement. Young Nigerians should leverage their social media presence to encourage voter registration, promote election literacy programs, provide fact-checking services to counter election misinformation, and advocate for nonviolent participation throughout the electoral cycle. They should convert their social media timelines into civic classrooms. Where can I find the information I need about voter registration processes? Where is my assigned polling station located? Where do I receive my Permanent Voter Card? How do I protect myself from spreading misinformation? How do I properly monitor election results? These are not dull topics; they represent essential tools required for surviving democracy.

Youth organizations, creators, and social media entities can also help facilitate offline civic engagement. Use your WhatsApp groups to alert others as registration deadlines approach. Use X Spaces and Instagram Live to focus on discussing relevant issues rather than hurling insults. Use TikTok to simplify the voting process. Use Facebook to motivate family members and first-time voters to participate in elections. Use whatever platforms are available to make civic obligation contagious. Nigeria’s youth have shown they can create viral content. Now they must begin to generate participation on a viral scale.

One of the most damaging myths in Nigerian politics is that “your vote doesn’t matter.” It is a self-fulfilling prophecy that only serves the interests of cynics, crooks, and machines whose success depends solely on low turnout. Yes, Nigeria’s electoral process has flaws. Yes, there have been numerous disappointments. However, the response to a flawed democracy is not abandonment; it is increased participation. By staying home on Election Day, youth essentially give their votes — and therefore control — directly to the very same groups they loathe.

Another mythological excuse for the youth’s failure to vote in Nigeria is the claim that “all politicians are alike.” No — they’re not all the same. While some politicians are inept, others are corrupt, and others exhibit both characteristics, democracy is not about seeking holy men or women; it is about making selections and enforcing accountability. An individual who refuses to make a selection for office because none of the options appear acceptable is ultimately selecting the candidate most likely to emerge victorious by default.

Nigeria’s youth already constitute the country’s largest demographic group. It is time for them to become its strongest democratic force as well. However, that will not be achieved by trending hashtags alone. Instead, it will be achieved when online energy is harnessed and directed toward political organization, civic education, voter registration, increasing voter turnout, and holding elected representatives accountable after elections.

The 2023 election saw remarkable youth participation but lacked follow-up. Therefore, the 2027 election should not produce another generation of disillusioned observers; instead, it should yield a new generation of participatory citizens. Let online flames ignite electoral power. Let debates become ballots. Let criticism evolve into participation. If Nigerian youth can dominate social media, they can also dominate democracy. The future will not be handed to them in a retweet. They must elect it into existence.

_________

♦ Chris Ulasi is on the Editorial Board of The West African Pilot News. He contributes stories about culture and tradition, elite politics, ethnicity and national integration, civil society, and social movement. He is a university professor, community builder, poet, film producer, recording the emergent Nollywood cultural history through film.

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Anthony Obi Ogbo

Between Silence and Sabotage: Jonathan’s Return to Political Manipulation

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“Jonathan’s calculated and weaponized ambiguity breeds deception and weakens emerging political alliances.” —Dr. Anthony Obi Ogbo

Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has once again found himself at the center of presidential speculation, floating silently above the country’s political waters while supporters aggressively market him as a possible candidate ahead of another critical election cycle. And once again, Jonathan is doing what he has mastered throughout his political career: saying nothing clearly while allowing political confusion to grow around him.

This pattern is not new. It is the same indecisive political behavior that defined some of the most consequential moments of his rise and fall. Jonathan became president in 2010 following the death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. At the time, many northern political stakeholders within the then-ruling PDP believed there was an informal understanding that Jonathan would complete Yar’Adua’s term but not seek another full term in 2011, thereby preserving the party’s zoning arrangement between North and South. Instead of taking a clear and immediate position, Jonathan spent months dribbling the nation politically. He neither fully denied nor openly confirmed his intentions until the political tension had already escalated nationwide.

By the time he eventually declared his candidacy, the damage had been done. Many northern allies who initially supported him felt betrayed, politically cornered, or deceived. The PDP fractured internally, regional distrust deepened, and Jonathan’s relationship with major northern power blocs deteriorated permanently. Though he won the 2011 election, the cracks created by that indecision followed him into 2015, contributing significantly to the coalition that eventually removed him from power.

Yet Jonathan learned little from that experience. Since losing reelection in 2015, his name has repeatedly surfaced during every major electoral cycle as a potential presidential contender. Each time, his supporters strategically floated his candidacy across media platforms and political circles. Each time, Jonathan refused to decisively shut the door. Silence became his political instrument, whereas ambiguity became his strategy.

Now the country is witnessing the same playbook again. As coalition politics intensify and opposition forces attempt to consolidate around alternative political movements, Jonathan’s name has resurfaced aggressively. Reports and speculations about his presidential ambition continue to dominate political discussions, especially within camps seeking to disrupt the growing momentum surrounding Peter Obi and emerging opposition realignments.

The troubling part is not merely that Jonathan’s supporters are campaigning. The troubling part is that Jonathan fully understands the implications of his silence. He knows that his political stature carries enough weight to destabilize fragile coalition negotiations. He knows his name alone can divide campaign structures, weaken consensus-building, and inject uncertainty into opposition calculations. Yet he refuses to publicly and definitively state where he stands.

That is not statesmanship. That is calculated political ambiguity. Jonathan’s political history is filled with similarly contradictory choices. After losing power in 2015, he received widespread praise for conceding defeat peacefully. He initially framed that decision as a sacrifice made to preserve Nigerian lives and prevent violence. Later, however, different narratives emerged suggesting international pressure, particularly from the United States under President Obama. The shifting explanations weakened what could have remained one of his strongest democratic legacies.

Then came another contradiction. Despite emerging politically from the PDP, Jonathan gradually aligned himself closely with the administration of former President Muhammadu Buhari, serving in diplomatic and goodwill capacities that many PDP loyalists considered politically inappropriate. This unusual closeness fueled longstanding allegations that elements within the APC establishment viewed Jonathan as a useful political instrument capable of destabilizing opposition coalitions from within. Whether those allegations are true or not, Jonathan’s conduct has consistently created room for suspicion.

His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible.

Today, his undeclared ambition is already generating confusion among supporters, coalition organizers, and opposition strategists. His political base remains uncertain. His campaign structure is invisible. His intentions are unclear. Yet his loyalists continue mobilizing aggressively in his name while he watches silently from the shadows.

Nigeria is too politically fragile for this kind of elite gamesmanship. At critical national moments, leadership demands clarity, courage, and accountability. Jonathan cannot continue operating as a permanent “maybe” in Nigeria’s political future, thoughtlessly hovering around every election season like an unanswered question designed to manipulate negotiations and weaken emerging alliances.

At this time, Jonathan should sit in or sit out! If he wants to run, he should declare openly, defend his record, and face the democratic process directly. If he does not intend to run, he should immediately and publicly withdraw his name from the political marketplace. Anything short of that increasingly looks less like political strategy and more like calculated deception. Nigeria deserves leaders who make difficult choices openly—not politicians who weaponize silence while others gamble with national uncertainty in their name.

♦ Publisher of the Guardian News, Professor Anthony Obi Ogbo, Ph.D., is on the Editorial Board of the West African Pilot News. He is the author of the Influence of Leadership (2015)  and the Maxims of Political Leadership (2019). Contact: anthony@guardiannews.us

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The Devastation of Insurgency: Nigeria Cannot Kill Its Way Out of Insecurity

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“Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent” —Dr. Declan Onwudiwe

Nigeria cannot kill its way out of insecurity. While military victories may win battles, only legitimacy, governance, and economic opportunity can secure lasting peace. Across the country, persistent violence, characterized by impunity and a tragic disregard for human life, has exposed the limits of a force-only approach. The time has come for a more sweeping and planned security response.

What is most troubling is the continuing victimization of innocent citizens, especially women and children. Reports of attacks on farmers, worshippers in churches and mosques, and travelers have become disturbingly routine. Kidnappings, sexual violence, and the killing of schoolchildren have weakened public confidence in the state’s ability to protect its people. These are not individual events but symptoms of a deeper structural crisis. Yet, Nigeria is not without options. A strategic and sustained plan can alter this trajectory.

Cooperation between Nigeria’s security forces and international partners is praiseworthy and necessary. However, a recurring weakness undermines these gains: areas cleared by the military are often left insufficiently secured, allowing insurgents and bandits to return. A viable strategy must go beyond clearing territory to consolidating control. Insurgent groups adapt rapidly; after defeat, they disperse, regroup, and re-emerge in areas where governance is weak. Every community reclaimed by force but left without sustained state presence risks becoming tomorrow’s battleground.

Experience from other regions underscores this point. Countries such as Colombia and Iraq that have made substantial progress against insurgency have done so by maintaining a firm and continuous government presence in liberated areas. Where state authority is visible through security, justice, and basic services, insurgents find it much harder to re-establish control. Where it is absent, violence returns. Nigeria must learn from this reality and prioritize holding territory as much as reclaiming it.

At the heart of the problem is a governance deficit. Insecurity persists not only because armed groups are present but also because the state is often absent. Recovered areas commonly lack functioning institutions, effective policing, and access to justice. Without these, citizens remain vulnerable, and security gains become temporary. A credible strategy must ensure that communities reclaimed by security forces are immediately supported with police presence, local administration, and basic services, including healthcare, education, and dispute resolution.

Equally important is the recognition that the population, not the battlefield, is the true center of gravity in counterinsurgency. Intelligence from local communities is indispensable, but it depends on trust. Where citizens feel protected and respected, they are more willing to share information. Where they feel neglected or abused, they withdraw. Strengthening this relationship between citizens and the state is essential.

Intelligence-led security operations are far more effective than broad, reactive force. Targeted precision, based on reliable information, disrupts insurgent leadership, logistics, and financing networks. But this requires the population’s cooperation. When criminals operate with impunity, and accountability is weak, citizens lose confidence and hesitate to engage. Restoring trust, therefore, requires both professionalism within the security forces and a justice system that swiftly and fairly punishes wrongdoing.

Beyond security operations, Nigeria must address the economic drivers of instability. Youth unemployment and underemployment remain major concerns. Many young people struggle to find meaningful livelihoods, keeping them vulnerable to exploitation by criminal and extremist networks. Security cannot be sustained without opportunity. Investments in agriculture, education, infrastructure, electricity, and small-scale industry are not just economic policies; they are security measures. A population rich in hope and opportunity is less susceptible to recruitment and radicalization by violent groups.

The question of self-defense has also entered public debate. While communities have a natural right to protect themselves and arm themselves, widespread and unregulated access to weapons carries serious risks. Criminological literature shows that the proliferation of arms without accountability can fuel cycles of violence and create new security challenges. The solution is not to transform communities into rival armed camps but to build structured partnerships between citizens and the state.

Community-based security initiatives can play a valuable role when properly organized, regulated, and integrated into the wider security framework. Groups such as local defense volunteers should operate under unambiguous legal authority, receive appropriate training, and remain accountable to state institutions. When managed effectively, such partnerships can enhance intelligence gathering, strengthen local resilience, and complement formal security forces.

Nigeria now remains at a crossroads. It can continue to approach insecurity primarily as a military problem and remain trapped in a cycle of temporary victories followed by renewed violence. Or it can adopt a more extensive, more strategic approach, one that acknowledges that sustainable security depends on governance, legitimacy, and opportunity as much as on force.

The way forward is clear. Nigeria must hold every liberated area through sustained security and governance. It must prioritize intelligence by building trust with local communities. It must deliver a visible and tangible state presence through schools, healthcare, and justice systems. It must formalize and regulate community-based security initiatives. And it must expand economic opportunities to reduce the appeal of violence and criminality.

Countries that have turned the tide against insurgency did so not through force alone, but by rebuilding the bond between the state and its people. Nigeria must do the same. Until that bond is strengthened, insecurity will remain not just a threat at the margins, but a challenge rooted at the core of the nation’s stability.

Only through a coordinated, long-term strategy can Nigeria move from managing insecurity to truly controlling it.

____

■ Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe, Ph.D., of the School of Public Affairs, Texas Southern University, is a Professor and Director, Africa Institute for Strategic Security Studies (AISSS). He is also on the EDITORIAL BOARD of  the WAP

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